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I. INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurs, courts and scholars have long grappled with the 
problem of defects arising in the course or process of organizing a business.  
Promoters’ failure to follow all the steps designated by statute for the valid 
existence of their business entity of choice exposes the owners of the 
putative, but officially non-existent, entity to personal liability for 
contractual obligations incurred in its name or torts committed in the course 
of its business.1  Other pertinent questions pertain to whether the “entity” 
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 1. For example, notwithstanding the simplification of the process of incorporation, 
many incorporators fail to comply with the minimal statutory requirements for a valid 
incorporation of a business enterprise.  See JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & 
RONALD J. GILSON, CASES ON MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 241-242 (7th ed. 2008) (“As 
appellate decisions continue to indicate, problems arise when a business enterprise purports 
to be incorporated but in some way has not fulfilled the statutory requirements for the 
process of incorporation.”).  For cases illustrating recent manifestations of the problem, see 
Milligan v. Milligan, et al., 956 So. 2d 1066, 1074 (Ct. App. Miss., 2007) (discussing a 
contention that the business “was a de facto corporation and thus had the legal ability to 
acquire ownership interest and title to property”); Pharmaceutical Sales Consulting Corp. v. 
Accucorp Packaging, Inc., No. 95-5961, 2007 WL 4259998 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2007) 
(discussing the de facto and estoppel concepts but holding them inapplicable in the 
particular case); Black Car and Livery Insurance, Inc. v. H & W Brokerage, Inc., No. 8615-
04, 2007 WL 914196 at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct March 8, 2007) (discussing corporation by 
estoppel and rejecting de facto status for purported corporation because “it never attempted 
to comply with the statutory requirements regarding incorporation”); Jade Sterling Steel Co. 
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can receive or make conveyances of property, maintain a suit or be sued in 
its own name, and whether investors will be able to rely on a lack of formal 
organization to avoid obligations to innocent third parties.2  The new 
battleground for this perennial problem is the limited liability company 
(“LLC”).  Within a short span since the entrance of this form of business 
association into the American legal landscape in 1977 with the passage of 
the Wyoming statute,3 the LLC has seen a meteoric rise as the business 
form of choice for many investors.4  The rise in popularity of the LLC has 
been accompanied by a corresponding call for regulatory guidance.5  One 
area that begs for such guidance is pre-organization liability.6 
 
v. Stacey, No. 88283, 2007 WL 416697 (Ohio App. Ct. Feb. 8, 2007) (holding that even 
though the defendant claimed his attorney had filed articles of incorporation, there had been 
no good faith effort to incorporate); Bishop v. Murphy, No. 05A-05-002, 2006 WL 1067274 
(Del. Sup. Ct. April 10, 2006) (holding that while it could only speculate as to why the 
incorporation process was not completed, the business had satisfied the criteria for a de 
facto corporation status.); Grabarek v. J’s Const. & Masonry, Inc., No. CV000092444S, 
2002 WL 1837845 (Conn. Sup. Ct. July 8, 2002) (holding that the defendant had taken good 
faith steps towards incorporation and deeming defendant a de facto corporation). 
 2. James D. Cox & Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporations 90-91 (2d ed. 2003). 
 3. See generally Robert R. Keatinge, et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of 
an Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 378 (1992) (examining the rekindled interest in 
unincorporated organizations that limit the liability of their owners to their investment); 
Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 BUS. LAW. 1 (1995) 
(describing the main features of LLCs); Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: 
A Catalyst Exposing the Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393 (1996) 
(elucidating several criticisms of the LLC model); Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind 
the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459 (1998) (examining the preceding 
events behind the acceptance of the LLC organization as a viable option); Douglas K. Moll, 
Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company: Learning (or not) from Close 
Corporations, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883 (2005) (concluding that the problems of 
minority shareholder oppression that exist under a close corporation also exist in LLC 
settings); Natalie Smeltzer, Piercing The Veil of a Texas Limited Liability Company: How 
Limited is Member Liability?, 61 SMU L. REV. 1663, 1664 (2008) (discussing the 
application of corporate veil piercing to LLCs in Texas state courts). 
 4. See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, When American Small Business Hit the Jackpot:  Taxes, 
Politics and the History of Organizational Choice in the 1950s, 6 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 5 
(2008) (“Today, we observe a steady increase in the number of LLCs. . . .”); Howard M. 
Friedman, The Silent LLC Revolution – The Social Cost of Academic 6eglect, 38 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 35 (2004) (describing the LLC as a new dominant form of business 
organization for small businesses); Larry E. Ribstein, LLCs: Is the Future Here?, 13 BUS. 
LAW TODAY 11 (Nov./Dec. 2003) (examining the rise in popularity of LLCs); Larry E. 
Ribstein, The 6ew Choice of Entity for Entrepreneurs, 26 CAP. U.L. REV. 325 (1997) 
(describing the LLC’s rise and its implications). 
 5. Larry E. Ribstein, An Analysis of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 35, 36 (2008) (making reference to “the rapid rise in LLC filings 
and corresponding increase in the demand for guidance in the regulation of the LLC form”). 
 6. A whole range of pre-formation questions, mirroring the situation with 
corporations, is expected to arise with LLCs as they continue to grow in number, usage and 
influence.  See Dustin R. Darst, Corporate Pre-Organization Liability in an LLC World, 61 
ARK. L. REV. 301 (2008) (stating that the issue of pre-organization liability of individuals 
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In the older forms of business organization, the courts stepped in to 
remedy the problems occasioned by defective organization by cloaking the 
owners with limited liability that a proper organization traditionally affords 
and recognizing the validity of the contracts.7  This investiture has been 
accomplished through the doctrines of de facto corporation, corporation by 
estoppel, and analogous concepts in general and limited partnership law.8  
This article argues for a similar treatment for LLCs, mindful of the 
resistance that has trailed the application of these concepts to the earlier 
business forms and the cold reception that has greeted their recognition in 
 
“has grown in importance in Arkansas and around the country as the majority of new firms 
and businesses opt to form as LLCs”); William J. Rands, High Pressure Sales Tactics and 
Dead Trees: What to do with Promoters’ Pre-incorporation Contracts, 4 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 
1, 38 n.133 (2007) (stating that “LLCs are so similar to corporations, especially as to the 
method of formation and the doctrine of limited liability for its owners, it is inevitable that 
the pre-formation issues will soon arise.”). 
 7. It should be noted that this problem is not limited to initial formation but also arises 
in the case of continuation of business in the entity name after expiration, revocation or 
forfeiture of the corporate charter or similar organizational status.  See generally, N. Kenova 
Dev. Co., v. Wilson, No. 08CA6, 2008 WL 5077648 (Ohio App. Ct. Nov. 21, 2008) 
(discussing effect of operating after cancellation of corporate charter); City of Cincinnati v. 
York Masons Bldg. Ass’n, Nos. C-080003, C-080019, 2008 WL 3878320 (Ohio App. Ct. 
Aug. 22, 2008) (holding that reinstatement of cancelled articles of incorporation  permitted a 
corporation  to operate as a de facto corporation); In re Estate of Woodroffe, 742 N.W.2d 
94, 102 (Iowa 2007) (holding that “once a de jure corporation’s term of existence [ends] 
pursuant to its charter, it [cannot] continue to exist as a de facto corporation or corporation 
by estoppel.”); Stevenson Lumber Suffield, Inc. v. Winloc, Inc. et al., No. CV065000568S, 
2007 WL 4637140 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Dec. 7, 2007) (noting that a dissolved corporation may 
be recognized as a de facto corporation under certain limited circumstances); Briarpatch 
Ltd., L.P. v. Geisler Roberdeau, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 9623, 2007 WL 1040809 at *17 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 4, 2007) (noting that post-dissolution of corporate powers qualifies a dissolved 
corporation as a de facto corporation); Lodato v. Greyhawk N. Am., LLC, 834 N.Y.S.2d 
237, 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that a dissolved corporation had neither de jure nor 
de facto existence and those purporting to act on behalf of such corporation are personally 
responsible for obligations incurred, unless they acted without actual knowledge of the 
dissolution); Orix Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Leclair, No. 05-CV-9405KMK, 2007 WL 633706 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007) (operating under a revoked charter); Nationwide Airlines (Pty) 
Ltd. v. Afr. Global, Ltd., No. 3:04 CV 00768, 2007 WL 521155 (D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2007) 
(granting de facto corporation status to a corporation that was dissolved and reinstated); Nw. 
Med. Imaging, Inc. v. Alaska Dep’t. of Revenue, 151 P.3d 434 (Alaska 2006) (holding that 
there was a de facto corporation even after administrative dissolution); Definitive Res., Inc. 
v. United States, No. DKC 2005-3233, 2006 WL 3423854 (D.Md. Nov. 28, 2006) 
(discussing de facto and estoppel concepts where corporate charter had been revoked). 
 8. See Wayne N. Bradley, An Empirical Study of Defective Incorporation, 39 EMORY 
L.J. 523, (1990) (studying the history and policy behind de facto incorporation and defective 
incorporation); Douglas C. Waddoups, American Vending Services, Inc. v. Morse: The 
Problem of Defective Incorporation in Utah, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 303 (“In an attempt to 
protect shareholders who inadvertently fail to comply with the formalities of incorporation, 
the common law developed the doctrines of de facto corporations and corporation by 
estoppel, which, when applicable, protected shareholders and third parties dealing with 
defectively formed corporations.”) 
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the LLC context. 
The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act,9 the Revised Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act,10 and the Prototype Limited Liability 
Company Act11 are remarkably silent on the issue of defective formation,12 
presumably leaving the question of the status of members of such LLCs to 
the nebulous notion of “the principles of law and equity.”13  Some courts, 
responding to the problem, have adopted a “de facto corporation” or 
“corporation by estoppel” analysis in shielding the organizers of the LLC 
from liability.14  This is not entirely surprising.  As has been counseled, 
“[g]iven the parallels between limited liability company organization and 
incorporation, the courts may well look to the corporate jurisprudence for 
guidance.”15  Notable commentators have also started weighing in on the 
need to recognize de facto LLCs and LLCs by estoppel.16  According to 
Ribstein and Keatinge: 
A firm that has not been properly formed as an LLC . . . might be 
recognized as having been technically formed—that is, as a “de 
facto” LLC—even in the absence of proof of filing. Some LLC 
statutes provide that the firm may not transact business prior to 
formal existence or that parties who assume to act as an LLC 
prior to formation are personally liable for debts. Such provisions 
are questionable to the extent that they result in nonenforcement 
of preformation deals contrary to the parties’ clear expectations. 
Accordingly, the law probably should permit the recognition of 
 
 9. Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act (1996). 
 10. Rev. Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act (2006). 
 11. Am. Bar Ass’n Prototype Ltd. Liab. Co. Act (1992). 
 12. See also GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, 8 LOUISIANA. CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 44.05 (2009) (“Except for the rules concerning the 
effects and timing of a certificate of organization, the LLC statute says nothing about the 
liability of a promoter of an LLC for pre-formation contracts, or about the liability of a 
participant in a purported LLC that was not properly formed at the time the liability arose.”) 
 13. Daniel S. Kleinberger, A User’s Guide to the 6ew Uniform Limited Partnership 
Act, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 583, 625 (2004). 
 14. See cases discussed in Part IV below.  See also Elizabeth S. Miller, Are the Courts 
Developing a Unique Theory of Limited Liability Companies or Simply Borrowing From 
Other Forms? 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 617, 631 n. 67 (2009) [hereinafter Miller, Unique 
Theory] (“Courts have consistently borrowed principles developed in the corporate context 
regarding de facto incorporation, corporation by estoppel, and promoter liability in cases 
that involve transactions in the LLC name prior to the filing of the articles of 
organization.”). 
 15. Matthew G. Dore, 5 Iowa. Practice Series:  Business Organizations § 13:3 (2007). 
 16. See CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: 
TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 6.02[2][d][i] (2008) (“The de facto doctrine should apply to 
limited liability companies as well as to corporations.”)  See also id. ¶ 6.02[2][d][ii] (“The 
analysis that supports applying the de facto doctrine to limited liability companies also 
supports the concept of ‘limited liability company by estoppel.’”) 
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LLCs “by estoppel.”17 
The authors of a major treatise on business organizations have also noted 
that a “group of persons who associate with the intent of becoming . . . [an] 
LLC but who do not file the appropriate original document could be . . . 
considered [an] LLC by estoppel. The concept of a de facto LLC is still 
evolving . . .”18  It is imperative to undertake a closer examination of the 
evolution of the de facto and estoppel concepts in the LLC context and 
ensure that the development is not derailed. 
This work has surveyed judicial and legislative trends in the 
development and application of the notion of de facto LLCs and LLCs by 
estoppel in all the 50 states and the District of Columbia, with the influence 
of the precursor counterpart concepts in corporate and partnership law in 
the background.  It observes that while some states appear to be 
comfortable with the concepts of de facto LLC and LLC by estoppel, others 
have not embraced them.19  In states that have either categorically rejected 
these defensive doctrines or made no provisions for their application, the 
import may be that not only are the individuals behind the businesses 
unlimitedly liable, but also the LLCs are unable to enforce the contracts 
even when they eventually come into existence.  Describing the extant state 
of the law, one commentator has observed: 
Another concern that may arise with respect to transactions made 
on behalf of a limited liability company before it is organized is 
whether the company can enforce those transactions once the 
company’s organization is complete. Some courts have held that 
a limited liability company acquires no rights under contracts or 
 
 17. Larry E. Ribstein & Robert R. Keatinge, 1 Ribstein And Keatinge On Limited 
Liability Companies, §4:15 (June 2009). 
 18. ROBERT R. KEATINGE & ANN E. CONAWAY, KEATINGE AND CONAWAY ON CHOICE 
OF BUSINESS ENTITY: SELECTING FORM AND STRUCTURE FOR A CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS § 
3:7 (2009). 
 19. See e.g., Peter D. Hutcheon, The 6ew Jersey Limited Liability Company Statute: 
Background and Concepts, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 111, 131 (1993) (“An LLC may be 
formed under the New Jersey statute by filing a certificate of formation with the Secretary 
of State. Analogous to limited partnership law, there is no such thing as a de facto LLC.”); 
Jon T. Anderson, 6ational Business Institute: Examining And Resolving Title Issues, 34539 
NBI-CLE 131, app. at 161 (2006) [hereinafter Anderson, Title Issues] (stating that in 
Vermont, “there is presently no judicially recognized concept of a de facto limited liability 
company as there is with respect to corporations.”); Robert W. Hamilton, Elizabeth S. 
Miller & Robert A. Ragazzo, The Formation of Limited Liability Companies, 20 TEX. PRAC. 
SERIES TM:  BUS. ORG. § 19.4 (2d ed.) (2008) (doubting the possibility of the “application of 
a ‘de facto LLC’ doctrine in the case of a failure to file the articles of organization” in 
Texas); SUSAN KALINKA, 9 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE, LLC & PARTNERSHIP BUS. & TAX PLAN § 
1.4 (3d ed. 2008) (raising the possibility that in Louisiana, members of an LLC whose 
articles had been revoked or which does not have the relevant documents on file with the 
secretary of state “can successfully assert an argument that the organization is a de facto 
limited liability entity or that a limited liability entity exists by estoppel”) 
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conveyances in its name if the company did not exist at the time 
the contract or conveyance was made. Absent a special law 
validating such contracts or conveyances, arguments that the 
transactions are valid under a “de facto limited liability 
company” or “limited liability company by estoppel” theory have 
met with only limited success.20 
A central mission of this article is the transformation of the above 
picture through a presentation of a compelling case for the universal 
application of the de facto LLC and LLC by estoppel concepts to pre-
formation contracts.  The article also aims to extend the recognition of the 
defective organization concepts to cases where no contracts or conveyances 
were made (namely, appropriate cases in tort) and where no LLC was 
formed subsequent to the contract or conveyance.  Generally, the doctrines 
should also be recognized in situations where one party seeks to impose 
personal liability on persons conducting business on behalf of an unformed 
LLC or where an unformed LLC and its managers seek to evade 
obligations after the business has been represented to a third party as an 
LLC.  In summary, owners of improperly formed LLCs should enjoy 
limited liability protection when such investors, in good faith, believe that 
an LLC had been formed or where there have been dealings on the basis 
that an LLC is a party.  This approach will simplify the application of the 
de facto and estoppel concepts while ensuring justice and fairness. 
The Article is organized into  six major parts.  Part II is an 
introduction to the nature of the LLC business form and a possible 
explanation of its growing popularity.  This development underscores the 
importance of examining the effect of the growth on the business sector 
and those that have dealings with LLCs.  Part III presents a synopsis of the 
historical evolution and application of the concepts of de facto corporation 
and corporation by estoppel, including their attempted elimination and 
ultimate resurrection under the model corporation statutes.  This part also 
discusses related concepts in other business forms, including de facto 
limited partnerships, limited partnerships by estoppel and general 
partnerships by estoppel.  Part  IV examines the journey of these concepts 
into the LLC arena and to what extent the hostility that surrounded them in 
the corporation and partnership contexts has survived or diminished in the 
context of LLCs. In that connection, statutory provisions and judicial 
decisions are discussed. 
Part  V, relying on a seven-fold rationale, proposes the adoption by all 
states of an assuming-to-act provision that incorporates a knowledge 
component.  The import of the provision is to impose personal liability only 
on those who enter into pre-formation contracts or cause tortious injury to 
 
 20. DORE, supra note 16, at § 13.3. 
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third parties while acting as an LLC knowing there has been no proper 
formation, provided that those who present or accept a business as an LLC 
may not act contrary to that fact.  In the same vein, innocent investors who 
have a passive role or operate under the erroneous belief that the business 
has been properly registered as an LLC would enjoy the same limited 
liability protection afforded those who comply fully with the pre-
organization requirements.21  The adoption of the proposal will preserve the 
doctrines of de facto LLC and LLC by estoppel.22 
This approach strikes a balance and satisfies the need for fairness in 
protecting the interests of diligent creditors and credible investors.  
Alternative approaches would guarantee windfall profits to some creditors 
contrary to their contractual expectations or enable business owners in all 
cases to skirt statutory rules with impunity.23  More specifically, the 
proposal emphasizes prudence in business policy, promotes compliance 
with statutory provisions, protects third parties who would benefit from the 
notice function that registration serves, secures land titles, obviates 
excessive or incommensurate punishment, reduces risk to innocent 
investors interested in doing business in the LLC form, and prevents 
extension of windfall profits to some creditors beyond their contractual 
expectations.  Section B of this part applies the proposal to a number of 
scenarios by creating a taxonomy.  The final section of Part  V presents a 
critical appraisal of the proposal.  Part VI concludes the critical task that 
this work has undertaken of illuminating judicial and legislative action 
regarding the birth of the defective organization doctrines in the LLC 
context and eliminating any tendency by the courts and legislatures to 
squash the march toward their adoption. 
 
 21. See Joseph L. Levinsohn, Liability to Third Persons of Associates in Defectively 
Incorporated Associations, 13 MICH. L. REV. 271, 282 (1915) (stating that it is “repugnant 
to the requirements of justice and the needs of the business community [to] subject the 
modest investor, who has purchased a few shares of stock in a great railroad, financial or 
industrial corporation which chanced to be defectively organized, to full personal liability 
for all the debts of the company”); Calvert Magruder, A 6ote on Partnership Liability of 
Stockholders in Defective Corporations, 40 HARV. L. REV. 733, 745 (1927) (staking a 
position against any disposition to make the law “lurk privily in dark places, intent upon 
ruining a person who, in the exercise of that degree of care which it is practicable to expect, 
makes an investment in the stock of a business organization that purports to be, and behaves 
as though it were, a de jure corporation”). 
 22. See Norwood P. Beveridge, Corporate Puzzles: Being a True and Complete 
Explanation of De Facto Corporations and Corporations by Estoppel, Their Historical 
Development, Attempted Abolition, and Eventual Rehabilitation, 22 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 
935, 971 (1997) (stating that a similar provision in the Model Business Corporations Act 
restored the defective incorporation doctrines to the status quo before their attempted 
abrogation). 
 23. However, in some cases agency law may provide a basis for liability for those 
acting with knowledge that there is no LLC.  See id. at 943 (stating principles of agency 
liability when representing a nonexistent principal). 
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II. NATURE AND POPULARITY OF THE LLC 
The LLC is a relatively recent innovative business form that combines 
some of the most attractive features of a corporation (separate legal 
personality and limited liability) and those of a partnership (pass-through 
taxation and contractual flexibility).  Put differently, the LLC is a hybrid 
business form, with partnership and corporate characteristics.24  The hybrid 
nature of the LLC usually comes into focus in efforts to decipher the 
intention behind the provisions of LLC statutes.  Courts rely on partnership 
or corporate principles depending on the source of the provision being 
construed.25  The area of defective organization represents one—and 
perhaps the only—aspect of LLCs in which experiences from both 
partnerships and corporations may be simultaneously relevant.26 
In the past few years, the LLC indisputably has become the business 
organization of choice for many investors, especially those interested in 
small business.  The popularity of LLCs is traceable to a number of factors, 
although a full explanation beyond the present-day speculation may still 
 
 24. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of Limited 
Liability Company Acts – Issues Relating to Formation of Limited Liability Company and 
Addition or Dissociation of Members Thereto, 43 A.L.R. 6TH 611 (2009) (discussing the 
LLC form). 
 25. See Meyer v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Comm’n, 890 P.2d 
1361, 1363-64 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995) (comparing the LLC form to a partnership or 
corporation and reasoning that since the LLC possesses the limited liability feature of a 
corporation and not the personal responsibility that attaches to partners in a general 
partnership, an LLC cannot hold a retail package store liquor license).  See also Anderson v. 
Wilder, No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22768666, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 
21, 2003) (describing an LLC as a hybrid between state partnership and corporation 
statutes). 
[W]hen a court is interpreting an LLC act or agreement, the court will focus on 
the particular aspect of the LLC that gave rise to the problem, with emphasis on 
the foundational business form from which that characteristic originated.  
Usually, the particular aspect can be traced to either the corporate components 
or the partnership components of the LLC act or agreement. In such cases where 
the characteristic originated from the partnership aspects of the LLC, the court 
will use the established [principles] and precedent of the partnership law to 
resolve the issue . . . [.]  In such cases where the characteristic originated from 
the corporate aspects of the LLC, the court will utilize the established 
[principles] and precedent of corporate law to resolve the issue. 
Id. (quoting Annotation, Construction and Application of Limited Liability Company Acts, 
79 A.L.R.5TH 689, 698 (2000)). 
 26. For a critique of the judicial approach of relying on precedent from the older 
business firms to resolve questions that arise in the LLC context, see Miller, Unique Theory, 
supra note 15, at 647 (commending the borrowing as an efficient way of not re-inventing 
the wheel but cautioning against the sort of reliance that inhibits the development of a 
unique LLC approach that takes into account variations of earlier provisions that are tailored 
to the LLC context). 
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take a few years to emerge.27  LLCs are favored over corporations because 
they have pass-through taxation, instead of the double taxation 
characteristic of corporations.28  LLCs also hold a distinct advantage over 
general partnerships because they provide investors with limited liability.29  
Although some other business forms, notably the S corporation and the 
limited partnership (“LP”), have stepped in to remedy the above two 
disadvantages of earlier business forms, LLCs still present a clear 
advantage over them.30  In exchange for pass-through taxation, S 
corporations are saddled with a host of onerous restrictions, including a 
limitation on the number of shareholders to a maximum of 100, restriction 
to only one class of stock, non-admission of non-resident aliens as 
shareholders and restriction of shareholding generally to natural persons, 
with the exception of a few qualified estates and trusts.31  The LLC has 
none of these restrictions and is open to foreign investors, pension plans 
and corporate joint ventures.32 
Investors in LPs are not burdened with double taxation.  The business 
form also provides for limited liability.  However, not all the investors can 
enjoy that protection as there must be a general partner who always has 
unlimited exposure to personal liability.  A corporate general partner 
 
 27. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and 6etwork 
Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 128 (2001) (showing no clear answers from the 
available evidence). 
 28. See generally D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND CASE STUDIES 143 (Aspen Publishers, 2d ed., 
2008) (1962) (“Corporations also suffer from the dreaded problem of ‘double’ taxation – the 
notion that corporate profits are taxed once at the corporate level and then again at level of 
the individual shareholder after payment of dividends.”); Michael Doran, Managers, 
Shareholders and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517 (2009) (discussing 
corporate tax issues); Ryan Sklar, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors from Hedge 
Fund Managers’ Conflicts of Interest, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3251, 3262 n.90 (2009) (noting 
the preference of pass-through taxation over double taxation). 
 29. See ELLEN S. FRIEDENBERG, ET AL., 3 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE 
AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 50:11 (Apr. 2009) (stating that members of an LLC have limited 
liability while partners in a general partnership have unlimited liability). 
 30. See Mary Elizabeth Matthews, The Arkansas Limited Liability Company: A 6ew 
Business Entity is Born, 46 ARK. L. REV. 791, 792-93 (1994) (“The combination of those 
two attributes has been available previously in both the limited partnership and the S 
corporation formats. However, the LLC enjoys significant advantages over each of the 
alternatives.”). 
 31. See I.R.C. § 1361(b) (2004) (setting forth the tax structure of S corporations).  
Earlier provisions on the maximum number of shareholders were even more restrictive, with 
a limit of 35 shareholders prior to 1996, 75 shareholders from 1996 to 2004, and 100 
shareholders since 2004 when Congress passed the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.   
See MICHAEL T. MADUSIB, ET AL., 1 LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 1:54 n.5 (Aug. 
2009) (noting limitations in the number of shareholders in S corporations). 
 32. See Matthews, supra note 30, at 795 (pointing to the relaxations of ownership 
restrictions as the most important advantage of LLCs over S corporations). 
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(“CGP”) may be used to circumvent the personal liability problem, but not 
only is it still a more circuitous process than simply forming an LLC, but 
the LP may be taxed as a corporation in some situations.33 
The limited liability partnership (“LLP”) comes closest to paralleling 
the combination of the advantages of the LLC, including limited liability 
for all investors and absence of double taxation, while not necessarily 
embracing all the restrictions of the S corporation.  However, the LLC has 
some advantages vis-à-vis the LLP.  First, LLCs provide a full shield of 
limited liability.  While LLPs in many states also provide a full shield, 
some states only provide a partial shield protecting partners from 
partnership obligations arising in tort, but not from contracts,34 or covering 
both contracts and torts but imposing some form of limitation on the 
protection, such as supervisory liability.35  Second, the LLC generally does 
not impose a burden of annual renewal, while the LLP needs to file an 
annual application for renewal of its certificate to maintain its limited 
liability status.36  Moreover, there is also the concern among many lawyers 
that “the LLP shield is more ‘porous’ than the shield provided by 
corporations or limited liability companies.  For example, does the 
principle that any change in membership in a partnership constitutes a 
termination of the old partnership and the creation of a new partnership 
affect the LLP election?”37  In some states,LLPs are also required to obtain 
 
 33. The LP will be taxed as a corporation where the CGP does not have substantial 
assets that could be reached by a creditor or where the CGP is a mere shell acting as an 
agent of the limited partners.  See Susan Kalinka, The Limited Liability Company and Sub-
chapter S: Classification Issues Revisited, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1103-04 (1992) 
(discussing the liability of Corporate General Partners in an LLC); Matthews, supra note 30, 
at 793 n.8 (discussing the same). 
 34. See e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-12 (1953) (exempting partners in LLPs from 
partnership obligations arising in tort); Fredric J. Bendremer, Delaware LLCs and Veil 
Piercing: Limited Liability Has Its Limitations, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 385, 393 
(2005) (discussing liability shields under various state LLC laws); Gregory Scott Crespi, 
Choice of Law in Veil-Piercing Litigation:  Why Courts Should Discard the Internal Affairs 
Rule and Embrace General Choice-of-Law Principles, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 
127 n.130 (2008) (noting the same). 
 35. See TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN. § 152.801(b) (providing that a partner in an LLP is 
liable for the tort of those under his supervision or where he participates in the activity in 
which the tort arose or where he was informed of tort and did not act to prevent or correct 
it); Kus v. Irving, 736 A.2d 946, 947 (1999) (construing Connecticut statute that imposes 
supervisory liability on partners in an LLP). 
 36. See MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 12, at § 44.05 (“The LLC statute imposes no 
conditions to limited liability beyond the issuance by the secretary of state of a certificate of 
organization.”); Carol J. Miller, LLPS: How Limited is Limited Liability? 53 J. MO. B. 154, 
156 (May/June 1997) (discussing filing requirements).  It should be noted that an LLC 
statute may require the filing of annual reports by all LLCs in the state failing which an LLC 
may lose its status.  See KALINKA, supra note 19 (discussing the applicable situation in 
Louisiana). 
 37. ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
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and maintain a liability insurance policy or segregate funds in lieu thereof, 
which could be onerous on business start-ups.38  Further, unlike an LLP, 
one person can form an LLC in most states thus making it possible for 
single entrepreneurs to adopt the form.39  Not only is the LLP option 
foreclosed to such individuals, but opting for an LLC obviates the extra 
hassle of searching for compatible and reliable business associates.  
Finally, some states restrict the use of LLPs to professional firms, while the 
LLC may be adopted by people engaged in various forms of businesses.40 
None of the statements above should be construed as suggesting that 
the LLC is devoid of disadvantages in comparison to the other business 
forms.  Because the LLC is relatively new, the law is still in development.  
This could create uncertainty and make many investors uncomfortable.41  In 
addition, a merger or other reorganization between an LLC and a larger 
publicly held corporation will be subject to taxes.  If the transaction 
involves corporations only, it will be completed on a tax-free basis.42  
Furthermore, LLCs face franchise taxes in some states, a situation shared 
with corporations but not with the various forms of partnership.43 
These disadvantages do not seem to overly deter investors, as the 
popularity of LLCs continues to soar.  Recent data on new formations and 
active entities in Delaware, for instance, show a clear lead for LLCs.  LLCs 
constituted more than 65 percent of new entities formed in the state in 
2008, with 82,680 new filings compared to 27,906 for business and 
 
CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 52 
(Thompson-West, 10th ed., 2007) (1976); see also Kelly L. Jones, Law Firms as Limited 
Liability Partnerships: Determining the Scope of the Liability Shield: A Shield of Steel or 
Silk? 7 Duq. Bus. L.J. 21, 25 (2005) (“Despite the existence of a full shield, the strength and 
thickness of that shield remains unsettled; in other words, is the shield one of steel or one of 
silk?”). 
 38. See Robert W. Hamilton, Entity Proliferation, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 859, 863 n.6 
(2004) (summarizing the evolution of partnership liability in LLPs). 
 39. SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 117 (discussing the LLP form generally). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See ALVIN L. ARNOLD, REAL ESTATE INVESTORS DESKBOOK § 3:37 (3d ed. 2009) 
(stating that “the short existence of the LLC as an entity means very few court decisions 
have been rendered. Thus, a good deal of uncertainty exists as to the legal status of the LLC 
and its members”); Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables (Or At Least Understand Why 
You Should): Can Better Warning and Education of Prospective Minority Owners Reduce 
Oppression in Closely-Held Businesses? 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 504 (2009) 
(“In fact, one advantage of the LLP over the LLC is that it comes with a ‘built in’ body of 
case law developed over decades in the general partnership context.”) (citation omitted). 
 42. See ROBERT A. RAGAZZO & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 986 (Thompson-West, 2006) (2006) 
(discussing the ease of corporate reorganization and merger between two corporations). 
 43. See RONALD R. CRESSWELL, ET AL., 4 TEX. PRAC. GUIDE WILLS, TRUSTS AND EST. 
PLAN. § 13:44 (stating that in Texas, the franchise tax applies to corporations and LLCs); 
ARNOLD, supra note 41, at § 3:37 (stating that franchise taxes are not normally payable by a 
partnership). 
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professional corporations, 7,705 for LPs, 73 for LLPs, 84 for limited 
liability limited partnerships (“LLLPs”), 103 for general partnerships and 
2,622 for business trusts.44  While there was a general decline in overall 
filings, the trend is consistent with LLC dominance in recent years.  In 
2006, there were 97,508 new LLC filings and 112,982 in 2007.  These 
figures contrast sharply with the numbers for business and professional 
corporations (33,449 in 2006 and 34,144 in 2007), limited partnerships 
(9,901 in 2006 and 9,852 in 2007), limited liability partnerships (114 in 
2006 and 93 in 2007), limited liability limited partnerships (139 in 2006 
and 84 in 2007), general partnerships (161 in 2006 and 161 in 2007) and 
business trusts (3,904 in 2006 and 4,478 in 2007).45 
The wide use of the LLC raises the possibility that many organizers 
will not fully comply with statutory requirements, thereby exposing 
themselves and subsequent investors in the business to personal liability.  
Indeed, the problem of a lack of complete compliance with the statutory 
requirements for organizing a business has found its way already into the 
LLC arena and is only likely to escalate as the popularity of the LLC 
continues to grow.  The next part discusses how this issue has been treated 
in the context of other business forms. 
III. THE DE FACTO AND ESTOPPEL CONCEPTS IN OTHER BUSINESS FORMS 
The courts have long wrestled with the problem of defective 
organization.46  Torn between enforcing the clear requirements of the 
statute and ensuring that justice is done, the courts appear to be propelled 
by a desire to do justice between the parties.  The tendency to elevate 
substance over form by choosing to give effect to the statutory purpose 
instead of quibbling over technical details is not peculiar to business law.  
Other aspects of the law have devised similar instruments, such as the 
“substantial compliance” doctrine in estate planning that employs a 
“harmless error standard” to excuse will deficiencies and give effect to the 
intentions of the testator even when a will has not complied with the highly 
 
 44. International Association of Commercial Administrators:  Business Organization 
Section, 2008 Annual Report of Delaware (2008),  
http://www.gavinm.com/iaca/?country=USA&state=DE&section=BOS&print=true (last 
visited August 11, 2009). 
 45. Id.  See also INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COMMERCIAL ADMINISTRATORS:  
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION SECTION, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF DELAWARE,  
http://www.iaca.org/downloads/AnnualReports/2007_IACA_AR.pdf (last visited August 
12, 2009) (surveying business forms filed in various jurisdictions). 
 46. For instance, by the early 1900s, the de facto corporation doctrine had become a 
well established part of American law.  See Levinsohn, supra note 21, at 271 (discussing the 
de facto corporate doctrine). 
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technical details of the Wills statutes.47  This part discusses devices 
deployed in various business forms for ensuring justice and protecting 
contractual expectations. 
A. Corporation 
In response to defective incorporation and its attendant consequences, 
the common law devised the concepts of de facto corporation and 
corporation by estoppel.48  Where the owners of a business failed to comply 
with the fairly onerous requirements of incorporation, they automatically 
were unable to avail themselves of the primary benefit of incorporation, to 
wit, limited liability.  The courts introduced the de facto and estoppel 
concepts to rescue the organizers from such a predicament.  Although a 
defensible case could be made for according such protection, strong 
objections to its continuation emerged over time, especially as the 
incorporation process became more streamlined.  This led to the abolition 
of the doctrines of de facto corporations and corporations by estoppel in 
some states.49 
It is sometimes difficult to separate the concepts of de facto 
corporation and corporation by estoppel.50  The confusion associated with 
the distinction has led to the observation that there is simply “one unitary 
 
 47. See generally Joseph Karl Grant, Shattering and Moving Beyond the Gutenberg 
Paradigm: The Dawn of the Electronic Will, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 105, 121 (2008) 
(discussing the substantial compliance doctrine); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance 
with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1975) (discussing the doctrine of substantial 
compliance under the Wills Act); Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the 
Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1994) (analyzing the development of 
curative doctrines under the Uniform Probate Code); C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, 
Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform:  An Examination of the 6ew Uniform Probate 
Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167 
(1991) (examining the same). 
 48. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 22 (Foundation 
Press 2008) (discussing the development of the concept of de facto corporations and 
corporations by estoppel). 
 49. See, e.g., Sherwood & Roberts-Oregon, Inc. v. Alexander, 525 P.2d 135, 137 (Or. 
1974) (holding that a corporation cannot be formed without the issuance of a certificate of 
incorporation under the relevant Oregon state statute). 
 50. As one commentator concluded after a review and analysis of a sizeable number of 
cases: 
[O]ne should not view the cases as falling into the two traditional boxes, de 
facto corporation and corporation by estoppel . . . . Evaluated by what they do, 
not by what they say, judges apply one unitary doctrine—that of defective 
incorporation . . . . The apparent confusion shown by many judges in 
distinguishing the two doctrines reflects the fact that they are really not two 
doctrines at all. 
Fred S. McChesney, Doctrinal Analysis and Statistical Modeling in Law: The Case of 
Defective Incorporation, 71 WASH. U.L.Q. 493, 530-31 (1993). 
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doctrine . . . of defective incorporation” instead of two separate doctrines of 
de facto and estoppel.51  Nevertheless, this part approaches the discussion 
separately for purposes of clarity and because there is sufficient distinction 
between the two doctrines to merit the separate treatment.52 
1. De Facto Corporation 
A corporation that has complied with the mandatory requirements of 
incorporation is a de jure corporation.53  Such a corporation’s existence 
cannot be challenged by the state or any other entity or person.54  Where a 
valid corporation has not been formed due to technical defect in the process 
of incorporation the business may be treated as a de facto corporation, 
provided certain requirements are met.55  Thus, “a de facto corporation may 
be defined as an association of individuals who may have made a bona fide 
and colorable attempt to secure a charter and organize a corporation under 
an enabling act, and who actually assume the use of corporate powers.”56  
The existence of a de facto corporation may only be challenged by the state 
in a quo warranto proceeding.57 
 
 51. Id. at 530. 
 52. See, e.g., Boslow Family Limited Partnership v. Glickenhaus & Co., 7 N.Y.3d 664, 
668 (N.Y. 2006) (“The doctrine of estoppel is not the same as that of de facto corporation, a 
doctrine that requires a party to show that it made a colorable attempt to comply with the 
statutes governing incorporation.”); Pharmaceutical Sales & Consulting Corp. v. J.W.S. 
Delavau Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 398, 405 (D.N.J. 1999) (“The doctrines of de facto 
incorporation and corporation by estoppel are two related but distinct concepts.”). 
 53. See Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. 1964) (stating that “a de jure 
corporation results when there has been conformity with the mandatory conditions 
precedent (as opposed to merely directive conditions established by the statute)”); People v. 
Stockton & V.R.R., 45 Cal. 306, 307-08 (Cal. 1873) (holding that a corporate defendant’s 
corporate existence cannot be challenged where the defendant substantially complied with 
the relevant incorporation laws).  De jure status is possible even when all the requirements 
have not been met, provided the omitted requirement is directory, not mandatory, or the 
mistake is insubstantial.  An example of an insubstantial mistake is a mistake in the address 
of an incorporator.  See, e.g., People v. Ford, 128 N.E. 479, 481 (Ill. 1920) (holding that the 
requirement of a seal on certificate of incorporation was directory, rather than mandatory; 
therefore, since the certificate complied with state law in all other respects, a de jure 
corporation was formed); In re Spring Valley Water Works, 17 Cal. 132, 132 (Cal. 1860) 
(holding that the failure to describe a corporation’s place of business in the articles of 
incorporation is a technical error that does not render the corporation invalid). 
 54. See Ethanair Corp. v. Thompson, 561 N.W. 2d 225, 229 (Neb. 1997) (stating that a 
third party cannot attack the legal existence of a de facto corporation). 
 55. See Beavers v. Recreation Ass’n of Lake Shore Estates, Inc., 130 S.W.3d 702, 711-
12 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (stating the requirements for recognition of de facto corporations); 
Cantor v. Sunshine Greenery, Inc., 398 A.2d 571, 573 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) 
(discussing the same). 
 56. Thomas H. Breeze, The Liability of the Associates in a Defective Corporation, 16 
YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1906). 
 57. See DiFrancesco v. Kennedy, 160 A. 72, 74 (Conn. 1932) (“A de facto corporation . 
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Generally, based on the requisites outlined by the U.S. Supreme 
Court,58 courts will treat a business as a de facto corporation if it satisfies a 
three-part test:  (1) the existence of a statute permitting incorporation; (2) 
colorable compliance with the statute’s incorporation provisions; and (3) 
actual use or exercise of corporate powers and privileges.59  The rationale 
for recognizing de facto corporations is that a contrary position may 
sometimes defeat the contractual intent of the parties and lead to a situation 
where a party to a contract with the purported corporation would receive 
benefits beyond that for which he had bargained, i.e. a windfall.60  In 
addition, “[t]he recognition of a de facto corporation is based on the 
principle that the state, which alone has the power to incorporate, may 
waive irregularities in the organization of corporations, and so long as the 
state remains inactive as to that issue others must acquiesce.”61  The de 
facto doctrine is also rationalized on the ground that “[t]he state, by 
authorizing the corporate form, has recognized the economic advantages of 
limited liability”62 which should not be lightly extinguished on the ground 
of minor technicalities.63 
The de facto corporation doctrine became the object of severe 
strictures over the years.64  One of the major problems with the concept is 
 
. . is an association which actually exists for all practical purposes as a corporate body, but 
which, because of failure to comply with some provision of the law, has no legal right to 
corporate existence as against a direct attack by the State.”); Breeze, supra note 56, at 3 (“If 
the proceedings have been such that a de facto, but not a de jure corporation has been 
organized, the associates will be considered as shareholders and the incorporation can be 
questioned only by the state in quo warranto proceedings.”) (citation omitted). 
 58. See Tulane Irrigation District v. Shepard, 185 U.S. 1, 13 (1902) (setting forth three 
requirements that constitute a de facto corporation). 
 59. See Lichtenstein v. Consolidated Services Group, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 1, 14 (1st Cir. 
1997) (stating the three requirements for de facto corporations); Fleischauer v. Feltner, 879 
F.2d 1290, 1299 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating the same); Matter of S & T Terry Contractors, Inc., 
6 B.R. 84, 85 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. W. Div., 1980) (stating the same); Rockaway Imp., LLC v. 
Danco Transmission Corp., 801 N.Y.S.2d 138, 216 (N.Y. City. Civ. Ct. 2005) (stating the 
same); Application of Riverton Water Co., Inc., 932 P.2d 452, 500 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) 
(stating the same). 
 60. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 48, at 23-24 (discussing the concept of de facto 
corporations). 
 61. 18 C.J.S. De facto Existence § 91 (citation omitted).  See also Richard R. Daily, 
Note, Corporations – De Facto Existence – 6ecessity of Good Faith Attempt to Incorporate 
Under and of Colorable Compliance with Incorporation Statute, 53 MICH. L. REV. 283, 284 
(1954) (stating that “if any rights and franchises have been usurped they are rights and 
franchises of the state, and the state alone can object”). 
 62. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 16, ¶ 6.02[2][d][i]. 
 63. Id. 
 64. HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 37, at 251 (“The common law de facto doctrine, 
as applied by courts, in particular, has been the subject of much academic analysis and 
criticism.”). Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. 1964) (“[T]he concept of de facto 
corporation has been roundly criticized.”). See also Swindel v. Kelly, 499 P.2d 291, 299 
n.28 (Alaska 1972) (“The concept of de facto corporations has been increasingly disfavored 
DURUIGBOFINALIZED_TWO 8/9/2010  11:48 PM 
1028 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:4 
 
that there is no clear definition of what constitutes colorable compliance.65  
Some courts may insist on stricter requirements than others.66  For instance, 
it is not entirely strange to find a court recognizing the existence of a de 
facto corporation even though there has been a failure to file articles of 
incorporation.67  More than a half-century ago, Alexander Hamilton Frey 
undertook an extensive study of the subject.68  Apparently concerned that 
the courts were misusing the de facto doctrine, he derided the concept as 
“just so much jargon” that “ought to be abandoned,” adding that it was 
“legal conceptualism at its worst” that would be made a relic of history by 
modern corporation legislation.69  Frey’s conclusions have been heavily 
criticized by later scholars, both on methodological and substantive 
grounds.70  In particular, Professor Norwood Beveridge criticized Frey for 
not according enough recognition to the fact that “whether the defendants 
had taken reasonable steps to incorporate and reasonably believed they 
were incorporated” was a critical factor in a court’s decision whether to 
impose personal liability.71  Most significantly, Frey’s prediction of the de 
facto doctrine’s demise has largely gone unfulfilled. 
2. Corporation By Estoppel 
As mentioned in the previous section, the de facto corporation 
doctrine may only be invoked upon the satisfaction of certain conditions.72  
Where the requirements have not been met, the corporation by estoppel 
doctrine provides business owners with another channel for escaping 
personal liability for debts and obligations or preventing the other party 
from avoiding her obligations under the contract.73  Courts have opined that 
“the estoppel theory . . . may be invoked even when there is no corporation 
 
. . . .”). 
 65. See Levinsohn, supra note 21, at 289 (“What constitutes a colorable corporate 
organization is not easy to determine.”). 
 66. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law § 1.4.3(a) (2000). 
 67. See Bankers Trust Co. of W. N.Y. v. Zecher, 426 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1980) (holding that notwithstanding that the corporation entered into an equipment security 
agreement with lender prior to filing its certificate of incorporation with the Secretary of 
State, the corporation would be deemed a de facto corporation as of the date of the 
agreement). 
 68. Alexander Hamilton Frey, Legal Analysis and the “De Facto” Doctrine, 100 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1153 (1952). 
 69. Id. at 1178, 1180. 
 70. E.g., Bradley, supra note 8; McChesney, supra note 50. 
 71. Beveridge, supra note 22, at 963. 
 72. Supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 73. See E. Merrick Dodd, Partnership Liability of Stockholders in Defective 
Corporations, 40 HARV. L. REV. 521, 536 (1927) (“Even though these requisites do not 
exist, most courts will, to some extent, treat the group as an entity as between parties who 
have acted on the assumption that there is a corporation.”). 
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de facto.”74  In Cranson v. IBM,75 the certificate of incorporation, although 
signed and acknowledged, was not filed due to the defendant’s lawyer’s 
inadvertence.  The defendant operated on the information passed on by the 
lawyer that the corporation was in fact properly formed.  The court held the 
party that recognized the entity as a valid corporation was estopped to deny 
the incorporation.76  Professor Stephen Bainbridge explains that there is a 
basic difference between the corporation by estoppel doctrine and the 
familiar concept of equitable estoppel. Unlike the latter, the concept of 
corporation by estoppel does not require a misrepresentation, reasonable 
reliance, or change in position.77  “Instead, someone who deals with the 
firm as though it were a corporation is estopped later to deny the 
corporation’s existence.”78 
 Professors Robert Ragazzo and Douglas Moll have posited that part 
of the confusion with the corporation by estoppel concept is that it is not 
really one doctrine but a short hand for describing three separate 
doctrines.79  One aspect of the doctrine lays out the rule that a corporation 
may not rely on defective incorporation to avoid a contract.80  The scholars 
note that this aspect “involves a true estoppel:  those purporting to act for 
the corporation have represented to a third party that the corporation has 
been lawfully formed; the third party changes his position based upon this 
representation; and the corporation is not able to deny its corporate status at 
a later time.”81  The second branch of the doctrine postulates that a third 
party cannot validly anchor avoidance of a contract with a purported 
corporation on the fact that the business was defectively incorporated.82  
“This branch of the doctrine is actually a principle of corporate law rather 
than an application of traditional estoppel doctrine.”83  Finally, under the 
third aspect, which is also a principle of corporate law rather than 
traditional estoppel doctrine, shareholders of a defective corporation are 
 
 74. Cranson v. IBM, 200 A.2d 33 (Md. 1964). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 48, at 24. 
 78. Id. at 54; see also Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 514 P.2d 1109, 1111-1112 
(Or. 1973) (“The so-called estoppel that arises to deny corporate capacity does not depend 
on the presence of the technical elements of equitable estoppel, viz., misrepresentations and 
change of position in reliance thereon, but on the nature of the relations contemplated, that 
one who has recognized the organization as a corporation in business dealings should not be 
allowed to quibble or raise immaterial issues on matters which do not concern him in the 
slightest degree or affect his substantial rights.” (quoting BALLANTINE, MANUAL OF 
CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE, §§ 28-30 (1930))). 
 79. RAGAZZO & MOLL, supra note 42, at 291. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 291. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 292. 
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allowed to enjoy limited liability when a third party understood her contract 
to be with a purported corporation.84  The rationale for the second and third 
aspects is that “[w]hen a third party looks to a corporate entity as the sole 
obligor on a contract, he receives that for which he bargained when only 
the corporation is liable.”85 
Part of the justification for the doctrine is that to treat the parties 
otherwise would amount to imposing on them a contractual obligation that 
neither of them intended should be assumed.86  In applying the doctrine, the 
courts are ensuring that the parties only get that to which they are entitled 
under their contract.87  As Professor Edward Warren has noted, where 
business associates present themselves as a corporation and a third party 
decides to deal with them as such, the third party’s consent to the contract 
is also consent to “avail himself on a breach of contract of only such 
remedies as could be used if the associates possessed the corporate 
privilege.”88  The contrary position not only defeats the parties’ intentions 
and expectations, but seems to encourage bad faith.  Contrariwise, “[t]he 
immunity of the associates is founded upon good faith and upon estoppel of 
those who deal on the basis of one situation to maintain another for the 
purpose of enforcing demands to which they did not believe themselves 
entitled.”89  Accordingly, since there has been a meeting of minds, as 
contract lawyers use that term, on the proposition to limit liability it makes 
ample sense for the courts to enforce the parties’ implied stipulation.90 
 The corporation by estoppel doctrine is broader than the de facto 
corporation doctrine when viewed from the perspective that it provides 
limited liability protection even though no effort had been made to 
incorporate.  But it is also narrower than the de facto corporation doctrine, 
because, unlike the de facto concept, investors are not able to take 
advantage of it if they incur tort or non-contractual obligations since the 
victims could not have dealt with the business believing it was a 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 292. 
 86. See Charles E. Carpenter, Are The Members of a Defectively Organized 
Corporation Liable as Partners?, 8 MINN. L. REV. 409, 421 (1924) (arguing that intent to 
enter into a contract with a corporation demonstrates there was not intent to create 
individual liability). 
 87. Edward H. Warren, Collateral Attack on Incorporation, 20 HARV. L. REV. 456, 
475-76 (1907) [hereinafter Warren I]. 
 88. Id.  See also Edward H. Warren, Collateral Attack on Incorporation, 21 HARV. L. 
REV. 305, 313 (1908) [hereinafter Warren II] (“So, it may be urged, when A consents to 
deal with the associates as a corporation, he should not be allowed thereafter to take another 
position logically inconsistent [i.e., denying that they are a corporation].  There is force in 
that argument.”) (clarification added). 
 89. Levinsohn, supra note 21, at 284 (citing Slocum v. Head, 81 N.W. 673 (Wis. 
1900)). 
 90. Id. at 285. 
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corporation.91  Like the de facto corporation doctrine, the corporation by 
estoppel doctrine has also been subject to immense and intense criticism.92  
For instance, it is criticized for permitting those who have made untrue 
representations about corporate existence to escape personal liability.93 
3. The Model Corporations Act 
The 1950 Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) sought to whittle 
the effect of the doctrine of de facto corporation.94  The 1969 Model Act 
retained the text of the 1950 and 1960 revisions in stating that the 
certificate of incorporation shall be “conclusive evidence” of incorporation 
except as against the state and that all persons assuming to act as a 
corporation without authority would be jointly and severally liable for all 
the debts of the business.95  However, while the earlier official comments 
were at best tentative, the comments to the 1969 act unequivocally stated 
that “a de facto corporation cannot exist under the Model Act.”96  It took 
several decades for critics to acknowledge that efforts to abolish the de 
facto corporation and corporation by estoppel doctrines had failed.97  
Indeed, the predicted demise of the doctrines turned out to be clearly 
exaggerated.98  The Official Comment to the 1984 MBCA § 2.04 provides a 
helpful catalog of the odyssey of the defective incorporation doctrines 
through near-death and ultimate resurrection.  The Comment states in 
relevant parts as follows: 
A review of recent case law indicates . . . that even in states with . 
. . [statutes that impose personal liabilities for preincorporation 
transactions or obligations], courts have continued to rely on 
common law concepts of de facto corporations, de jure 
corporations, and corporations by estoppel that provide uncertain 
protection against liability for preincorporation transactions. 
 
 91. RAGAZZO & MOLL, supra note 42, at 292. 
 92. E.g., Bradley, supra note 8. 
 93. See GEVURTZ, supra note 66, at §1.4.3(b).  The criticism is well-noted but if the 
other party was content to deal with the entity as a limited liability entity, it may not 
necessarily be a fair outcome to allow it to receive more than what their bargain 
contemplated. 
 94. See Beveridge, supra note 22, at 966 (describing the act, and accompanying 
comments, which suggested there could be no de facto corporation before the issuance of 
the certificate of incorporation). 
 95. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 56, 146 (1969). 
 96. 1 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.04, historical background at 2-50 (3d ed. Supp. 
2000-2002) (emphasis omitted). 
 97. See Bradley, supra note 8, at 533-36 (explaining changes to the Model Act and 
comments and describing reactions to these changes). 
 98. See Douglas C. Michael, To Know a Veil, 26 J. CORP. L. 41, 47 (2000) (noting that 
Professor Frey’s prediction had not materialized). 
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These cases caused a review of the underlying policies 
represented in earlier versions of the Model Act and the adoption 
of a slightly more flexible or relaxed standard. Incorporation 
under modern statutes is so simple and inexpensive that a strong 
argument may be made that nothing short of filing articles of 
incorporation should create the privilege of limited liability. A 
number of situations have arisen, however, in which the 
protection of limited liability arguably should be recognized even 
though the simple incorporation process established by modern 
statutes has not been completed.99 
The Comment proceeds to outline some of these exceptions, three of 
which are germane to this article. They include a situation where (1) 
incorporation documents have not been filed due to attorney neglect or 
other cause but a corporate organizer reasonably and honestly believing 
they have been filed, enters into a transaction in the name of the 
corporation; (2) transactions entered into after the mailing of incorporation 
documents or their delivery to the filing office but they have not been 
received in the filing office due to no fault of the filer; and (3) cases where 
passive investors provide funds to the corporate promoter with express 
instructions that the funds should not be utilized prior to incorporation.100 
 The crucial point about the 1984 revision of the MBCA is that, 
unlike previous incarnations of the model statute, it did not seek to abolish 
de facto corporation outright or question its applicability.  It allows 
sufficient room for the de facto and estoppel doctrines to operate through § 
2.04, which provides that “[a]ll persons purporting to act as or on behalf of 
a corporation knowing that there was no incorporation under this Act, are 
jointly and severally liable for all liabilities while so acting.”101  In fact, so 
wide is the latitude for the operation of the doctrines that one scholar has 
remarked that the 1984 MBCA has “return[ed] the situation for all practical 
purposes to where it was in 1950” and therefore “[t]he comment should 
explicitly acknowledge that the doctrines of de facto corporations and 
corporations by estoppel are no longer abolished in Model Act states.”102  
While this sentiment is not universally shared, with some commentators 
willing to concede that the doctrines probably have been restored but not 
with the same force as before the Model Act, there is hardly any question 
about the survival of the doctrines under the current formulation of 
 
 99. 1 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN.  § 2.04, official cmt. at 2-46 (3d ed. Supp. 1997). 
 100. Id. at 2-46.  The other enumerated instances are where “the third person has urged 
immediate execution of the contract in the corporate name even though he knows that the 
other party has not taken steps toward incorporating” and where the “third person has dealt 
only with the ‘corporation’ and has not relied on the personal assets of the defendant.”  Id., 
at 2-47. 
 101. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 2.04 (1984). 
 102. Beveridge, supra note 22, at 971. 
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MBCA.103 
Borrowing from that, one can also safely interpret similarly worded or 
similar-purpose LLC statutes as also permissive of the application of the de 
facto and estoppel doctrines to LLCs.  In the same vein, LLC statues that 
import the pre-1984 formulation of the purporting-to-act provision can also 
be construed as restricting or rejecting the application of the doctrines. 
B. General Partnership 
Partnership by estoppel has been described as “one of the danger areas 
for small businesses and requires special vigilance.”104  Drawing on the 
English Partnership Act of 1890, the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 
codified the doctrine, a step that has been continued by the Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act of 1997, albeit under the different title of 
“purported partnership.”105  A person or firm may be held liable as a partner 
or partnership even though no partnership in fact existed or, in the case of 
an existing partnership, another person is held out as a partner in the 
firm.106  Representation and reasonable reliance are at the core of the 
partnership by estoppel concept.107  Thus, liability arises where a would-be 
partner directly holds himself out as a partner or is so held out by others 
with his consent, and a creditor who has knowledge of the holding out 
justifiably and detrimentally relies on the ostensible partnership by 
extending credit upon its faith.108 
 
 103. See e.g., Darst, supra note 6, at 321-23 (discussing common law defenses). 
 104. Robert B. Macaulay, Florida Small Business Practice, §5.5 (2004). 
 105. Howard P. Walthall, Sr., What Do You Mean “We,” Kemo Sabe?: Partnership Law 
and Client Responsibilities of Office Sharing Lawyers, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 601, 629-30 
(1998). 
 106. E.g., Gosselin v. Webb, 242 F.3d 412 (1st Cir. 2001); Justin Elrod, Annual Survey 
of Caselaw, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 805, 811-12 (2004); John W. Marshall, 
Partnership by Estoppel – Liability by Surprise, 46 B. B. J. 6, 6 (2002).  See also George M. 
Cohen, The Multilawyered Problems of Professional Responsibility, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1409, 1443 (“Under the doctrine of partnership by estoppel, however, lawyers who are not 
in fact partners may be held vicariously liable for each other’s malpractice if they hold 
themselves out to the public as partners . . . .”). 
 107. See Bradley T. Borden, The Federal Definition of Tax Partnership, 43 HOUS. L. 
REV. 925, 1000 n.407 (2006) (“[P]artnership by estoppel under substantive law requires 
reliance upon a representation.”); Jones, supra note 37, at 36 (2005) (emphasizing the 
reasonableness component). 
 108. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 308 (1997); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 16 (1914); Brown v. 
Gerstein, 460 N.E.2d 1043 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984), cert. denied, 464 N.E.2d 73 (Mass. 
1984); David A. Barry & William L. Boesch, Legal Malpractice Law in Massachusetts: 
Developments 1993-2000, 85 MASS. L. REV. 2, 21 (2000); Carter G. Bishop, The 6ew 
Limited Partner Liability Shield: Has the Vanquished Control Rule Unwittingly Resurrected 
Lingering Limited Partner Estoppel as Well as Full General Partner Liability?, 37 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 667, 702 (2004). 
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 In one case, two lawyers had openly referred to themselves as 
“partners” and listed themselves as such on their letterhead.109  One of the 
lawyers misappropriated a client’s funds.  The court held that the lawyer 
who had not participated in the misappropriation was nonetheless jointly 
and severally liable for the torts of the misappropriating lawyer.  The court 
reasoned that since the lawyers had represented that they were partners in 
fact, upon which representation the client had relied, the nonparticipating 
lawyer was estopped to deny the existence of a partnership.110 
 A partnership by estoppel could also be “created” where a general 
partnership upon electing LLP status, omits to conform with the 
requirements relating to designation as an LLP in relevant business 
documents and professional listings.111  In such a situation, “a creditor 
could invoke purported partner liability by arguing that he reasonably 
relied on the partner’s representations and thus understood the business to 
be a general partnership instead of a LLP.”112 
 The basis of the partnership by estoppel concept is justice to third 
parties whose interests would otherwise be jeopardized as a result of their 
reliance on the false representation that a partnership exists.113  As one 
commentator has noted, “the very point of the doctrine of partnership by 
estoppel is to impose liability when equity so demands, but the elements of 
a true partnership are not present.”114  Thus, without the application of the 
partnership by estoppel doctrine, those who have made misrepresentations 
as to partnership status or consented to such representations may be able to 
escape liability, taking refuge in technical legal rules.  Accordingly, the 
doctrine steps in “to prevent a party from hiding behind a technical rule of 
law when equity dictates that he or she be held to the legal consequences of 
 
 109. Myers v. Aragona, 318 A.2d 263 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Jones, supra note 37, at 36. 
 112. Id. at 36 (citation omitted).  See also Gregory Huffman, Creating the Legal 
Monster: The Expansion and Effect of Legal Malpractice Liability in 6orth Carolina, 18 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 121, 152 (1996) (“[A] limited liability partnership could become a 
partnership by estoppel . . . where the LLP or its partners hold themselves out as a normal 
partnership in some manner to a third party.”). 
 113. John W. Gergacz, A Proposal for Protecting Executive Communications with 
Corporate Counsel After the Corporate Client Has Waived its Attorney-Client Privilege, 13 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 35, 58 (2008) (“No organizational form is created when third 
parties rely on false representations that a partnership exists. Instead, liability is imposed, as 
if a partnership exists, to ameliorate the unfairness arising from the relying party’s otherwise 
unsatisfied claims. Without partnership by estoppel, the logic of partnership law has it that 
ersatz partners would not face liability. They were not parties by contract, personally, nor 
were they operating a business as a partnership. For justice reasons, the party’s interests 
needed to be accommodated.”) (citation omitted). 
 114. Edward L. Fenasci, Butler v. Atwood and Gravois v. New England Insurance Co.:  
Enigmas in Louisiana’s Law of Partnership by Estoppel, 46 LOY. L. REV. 353, 355 (2000). 
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his or her representations. . . .”115 
C. Limited Partnership 
1. De Facto Limited Partnership 
Early LP statutes and many judicial opinions in the United States 
recognized limited liability status of limited partners only where there had 
been strict compliance with the statutory provisions.116  “Thus, slight 
technical omissions in either the execution or filing of the certificate of 
limited partnership gave rise to unlimited personal liability for all partners, 
including persons who attempted to establish themselves as and believed 
themselves to be limited partners.”117  The strict statutory construction 
made it risky to participate in business as limited partners, generating a 
reluctance to invest in this business form.118  As a result, many business 
enterprises that would have found the LP to be most suitable to their needs 
were constrained to abandon that course of action and choose the less than 
optimal option of incorporation.119 
The codification and various revisions of the LP statute have sought to 
alleviate the hardship on limited partners and provide them greater 
protection from personal liability, even when they have not met all the legal 
requirements for operating as LPs.  The Uniform Limited Partnership Act 
(ULPA) of 1916 permitted limited liability status where there has been 
“substantial compliance” with the filing requirements.120  The courts came 
up with two main approaches to interpreting the statutory provision.  Some 
courts equated substantial compliance with attempted satisfaction of the 
basic statutory requirement, namely filing of certificate of formation.121  
Thus, if efforts were made to comply with the filing requirements but fell 
short in some minor detail, the court treated the entity as a limited 
partnership and thereby shielded the limited partners from personal 
liability.122  Other courts viewed the provision from the prism of the 
 
 115. Id. at 361. 
 116. R. Kurt Wilke, Limited Partnership Control: A Reexamination of Creditor Reliance, 
60 IND. L.J. 515, 517 (1985). 
 117. J. William Callison & Maureen A. Sullivan, Partnership Law and Practice: General 
and Limited Partnerships, § 19.3 (2008) [hereinafter Callison & Sullivan, Partnership Law]. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.  See also THE UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 2(2) (1916) (providing 
that “a limited partnership is formed if there has been substantial compliance in good faith 
with the filing requirements of [§ 2(1)]”). 
 121. See CALLISON & SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW, supra note 117, at § 19.3 
(discussing the doctrine of substantial compliance). 
 122. Id. 
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purpose it sought to accomplish to wit, protection of third parties by giving 
them notice of the nature of the business with which they were transacting.  
Accordingly, where a third party creditor has notice that the business is an 
LP, the limited partners are not personally bound for any contractual 
obligations arising from the transaction.123 
Under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA) of 
1985, which has been adopted by most states,124 the filing of a certificate of 
limited partnership is a condition precedent to the formation of a limited 
partnership.125  However, if no certificate is filed or a filed certificate is not 
in substantial compliance with the statutory requirements,126 limited 
partners are nevertheless provided with substantial protection if they acted 
under the mistaken belief that they were indeed limited partners.127  First, a 
limited partner in a defectively formed LP is liable only to a third party 
who believed in good faith that the limited partner was a general partner at 
the time of the transaction.128  With regard to future transactions, persons 
operating under the mistaken belief that they are limited partners may avoid 
personal liability if they cause a certificate of limited partnership or an 
amendment to the certificate to be filed or withdraw from future equity 
participation.129 
De facto LPs not only arise in the context of initial or amended filings 
but also in cases of certificate renewal.  Thus, where a creditor sought to 
hold partners personally liable for merchandise he had sold to the firm, 
claiming that since the LP had failed to secure the renewal of its certificate 
of authority from the secretary of state, it had transformed into a general 
partnership at the time the goods were sold, the Florida District Court of 
Appeal disagreed.130  Analogizing to a de facto corporation, the court held 
that the firm, upon failing to maintain its de jure status, became a de facto 
 
 123. Id.; cf. Gamma Farms v. United States, No. C-89-20688-RFP, 1990 WL 107421, at 
*5 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 1990) (holding that the notice argument was inapplicable under 
California law). 
 124. ALVIN L. ARNOLD & MYRON KOVE, REAL ESTATE PROFESSIONAL’S TAX GUIDE § 
37:1 (May 2009); Thomas E. Rutledge, To Boldly Go Where You Have 6ot Been Told You 
May Go:  LLCS, LLPS, and LLLPS in Interstate Transactions, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 205, 222 
(2006). 
 125. Reformed Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 201(b) (1976) (hereinafter 
“RULPA”). 
 126. See RULPA § 201(a) (setting forth the statutory requirements for filing a certificate 
of limited partnership). 
 127. See RULPA § 304 (discussing the protections provided for individuals who 
erroneously believe they are a limited partner). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  For a good discussion of this provision in a judicial opinion, see Briargate 
Condo. Ass’n v. Carpenter, 976 F.2d 868, 870-71 & n.6 (4th Cir. 1992) (discussing the 
potential liability of a woman who was deceived into investing funds into what she thought 
was a limited partnership when in fact the entity was a general partnership). 
 130. Vulcan Furniture Mfg. Corp. v. Vaughn, 168 So.2d 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). 
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LP.131  Accordingly, the limited partner retained his limited liability status.  
Explaining the basis of its decision, the court noted that the statutory 
purpose did not contemplate that a contributor of capital, who did not 
participate in the detailed operation of the business nor induce creditors to 
extend credit on the belief that the investor was a general partner, would be 
personally bound for the partnership’s obligations where “creditors had no 
reason to believe at the times their credits were extended that such person 
was so bound.”132 
 2. Limited Partnership By Estoppel 
The requirements for a limited partnership by estoppel are acts or 
representations by one party inducing another party to rely on the existence 
or acceptance of a limited partnership and reliance by the innocent party 
upon those acts or representations to his detriment.133  In applying the LP 
by estoppel doctrine, the courts are favorably disposed toward an outcome 
that ensures justice between the parties.  Accordingly, in an action brought 
by a purported limited partnership against its investment advisor seeking 
damages for breach of contract and negligence in managing funds, the 
court applied a “corporation by estoppel” approach in holding that 
regardless of the fact that the plaintiff failed to file its initial certificate of 
LP until after commencement of the lawsuit, the advisor was estopped to 
deny the validity of the plaintiff as an LP.134  The court took cognizance of 
the fact that the advisor derived benefit from the agreement it entered into 
with the plaintiff for the provision of investment services, provided 
investment services to the plaintiff, and the advisor’s provision of services 
was not dependent in any way on the plaintiff’s nature as an LP.135  
Therefore, the court denied the investor an opportunity to use the lack of 
proper formation as a “sword to escape liability after it benefitted from its 
contract with plaintiff.”136 
Some courts also justify the application of estoppel to protect limited 
 
 131. Id. at 764. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Leventhal v. Atlantic Rainbow Painting Co., Ltd., 172 A.2d 710, 714 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961) (holding that the association was not a limited partnership 
association, de jure, de facto, or by estoppel, when the members were injured in an accident 
almost a year after the association’s charter expired).  See also In re Lloyd Securities, Inc. v. 
Goldstein Mgmt., Inc., 1992 WL 165962, at *8 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (relying on the same 
principles to deny a claim of LP by estoppel because “the requisite innocent parties who 
relied on this status to their detriment are absent”). 
 134. Boslow Family Ltd. P’ship v. Glickenhaus & Co., 860 N.E.2d 711, 713 (N.Y. Dec. 
14, 2006). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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partners in defectively formed LPs on the ground that the limited 
partnership act is a notice statute.137  Thus, in a case where the appellee 
limited partners had admitted that they had failed to file a certificate of LP 
as required, one court was prompted to conclude that because the 
“appellants already had the information that would have been provided by 
compliance with the statute prior to dealing with the limited partnership, 
the failure to comply with [the statute’s filing requirements] does not cause 
appellees to lose their status as limited partners.”138 
In some states, the de facto and estoppel concepts have permeated the 
LLC structure, while other states have either jettisoned the doctrines 
altogether or have not addressed it through legislation or judicial decision.  
The following part first examines the legislative provisions, followed by a 
highlight of pertinent judicial decisions. 
IV. DE FACTO LLC AND LLC BY ESTOPPEL 
 Following the corporate model, a de facto LLC would exist where 
there is (1) a statute authorizing organization as an LLC in the state, (2) 
colorable compliance or good faith effort to comply with the statute, and 
(3) actual use or exercise of the powers and privileges of an LLC.139  An 
LLC by estoppel may arise where parties treat a business enterprise as a 
valid LLC even if no attempt at formal organization has been made. 
A. Statutory Provisions 
One legislative approach regarding commencement of business or 
incurring of obligations prior to registration of LLCs is to emphasize that 
there is no formation of an LLC until the filing of the articles or 
 
 137. See e.g., Garrett v. Koepke, 569 S.W.2d 568, 669 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (holding 
that because Texas’ limited liability statute is a notice statute and plaintiffs were provided 
with all of the information required by the statute prior to dealing with defendants, 
defendants’ status as a limited partnership does not fail despite the fact that they did not 
fully comply with the statute). 
 138. Id. at 579; cf. Dwinell’s Cent. Neon v. Cosmopolitan Chinook Hotel, 587 P.2d 191, 
194 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (“[A] third party’s knowledge regarding the status of a limited 
partnership is irrelevant when at the time of contracting, the partners have made no attempt 
to comply with the statutory information and filing requirements of the Limited Partnership 
Act . . . . A creditor has the right to rely upon there being substantial compliance . . . before 
the protection of [the limited partnership statute’s] provisions are afforded to any member of 
a partnership.  Here there was no compliance.”) (citations omitted). 
 139. Since all 50 states have LLC statutes, the first requirement is easily met.  See 
Wooster, supra note 24, at 611 (stating that the fifty states and the District of Columbia have 
all enacted LLC legislation).  For a discussion of the possible reasons for the speedy spread 
of LLC statutes to all fifty states, see Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership, 26 J. 
CORP. L. 819, 836-37 (2001) (discussing the emergence of LLC statutes). 
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organization or until the issuance of a certificate of organization or other 
document by the appropriate state official.140  Some states clearly provide 
that, save for a few activities, notably those incidental to the LLC’s 
organization or to obtaining subscriptions for or payment of capital 
contributions, LLCs may not transact business or incur debt prior to filing 
of the articles.141  Parties who choose to ignore the admonition or otherwise 
act contrary to it expose themselves to joint and several liability for debts 
and liabilities incurred while acting as an LLC when they lacked the 
authority to do so.142  Ten states143 have this rigid version in one form or 
another.144  A strict reading of such statutory provisions would negate the 
 
 140. J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: A 
STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:2 (2009) [hereinafter CALLISON & 
SULLIVAN, LLCS]. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. The states are Alabama:  ALA. CODE § 10-12-7 (West 2009) (“All persons who 
assume to act as a limited liability company without authority to do so shall be jointly and 
severally liable for all debts and liabilities created by their so acting.”); Arizona:  ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 29-652 (2010) (“All persons who assume to act as a limited liability company 
without authority to do so are jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities incurred 
by the persons so acting.”); Missouri:  MO. ANN. STAT. § 347.037.4 (West 2009) (“A limited 
liability company may not transact business or incur indebtedness, except that which is 
incidental to its organization or to obtaining subscriptions for or payment of contributions, 
until the articles of organization have been filed with the secretary or until the formation 
date specified in the articles of organization.  Persons engaged in prefiling activities other 
than those described in the preceding sentence shall be jointly and severally liable except as 
provided in this section for any debts or liabilities incurred in the course of those 
activities.”); Nebraska:  NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2635 (West 2009) (“All persons who assume 
to act as a limited liability company without authority to do so shall be jointly and severally 
liable for all debts and liabilities of the company.”); Nevada:  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
86.361 (West 2008) (“All persons who assume to act as a limited-liability company without 
authority to do so are jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities of the 
company.”); North Dakota:  N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-26 (West 2009) (“All persons who 
assume to act as a limited liability company without authority are jointly and severally liable 
for all debts and liabilities incurred or arising as a result.”); Rhode Island:  R.I. GEN. LAWS 
Ann. § 7-16-71 (West 2009) (“All persons who assume to act as a limited liability company 
without authority to do so are jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities.”); 
Utah:  UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-602 (West 2009) (“All persons who assume to act as a 
company without complying with this chapter are jointly and severally liable for all debts 
and liabilities so incurred, except for debts incurred in the course of prefiling activities 
authorized under Section 48-2c-404.”);  Virginia:  VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1007 (West 2009) 
(“It shall be unlawful for any person to transact business in this Commonwealth as a limited 
liability company or to offer or advertise to transact business in this Commonwealth as a 
limited liability company unless the alleged limited liability company is either a domestic 
liability company or a foreign limited liability company authorized to transact business in 
this Commonwealth.  Any person who violates this section shall be guilty of a Class 1 
misdemeanor.”); Wyoming:  WYO. STAT. Ann. § 17-15-133 (West 2009) (“All persons who 
assume to act as a limited liability company without authority to do so shall be jointly and 
severally liable for all debts and liabilities.”) 
 144. For instance, while Missouri statute forbids LLC pre-formation activities, with the 
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application of the de facto and estoppel concepts.  As a matter of fact, some 
courts have already decided along those lines.145  It appears that some of 
these states may have been influenced by Wyoming’s pioneering 
provision,146 which preceded the 1984 MBCA and might have been 
influenced by the pre-1984 versions of the Model Corporations Act.147  
With the 1984 MBCA pointing to a different direction, it may be wise to 
revise the various state laws in that respect.  Indeed, the rigid version does 
not seem to represent the modern trend.148 
Some states have statutory provisions that refuse to impose personal 
liability in some instances, such as when the LLC organizers or members 
acted without knowledge that there was no registration or acted with a good 
faith belief that they had authority to act.  Four states have this kind of 
provision.149  The remaining thirty-six  states and the District of Columbia 
 
exception of those “incidental to its organization or to obtaining subscriptions for or 
payment of contributions,” it adds that the “section shall not be interpreted to invalidate any 
debts, contracts, or liabilities of the limited liability company incurred solely on behalf of a 
limited liability company to be formed, nor shall it be interpreted to impose personal 
liability on the persons incurring such debts, contracts or liabilities solely on behalf of the 
limited liability company to the extent so disclosed or to the extent such debts, contracts or 
liabilities provide otherwise.”  MO. ANN. STAT. § 347.037.4 (West 2009).  Virginia makes it 
a misdemeanor punishable by a prison sentence of not more than twelve months and a fine 
of not more than $2,500 or both to transact business as an LLC without authority.  See VA. 
CODE ANN. § 13.1-1007, 18.2-11 (West 2009) (noting together that those who transact or 
offer to transact business as a limited liability company without authorization would be 
guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor, which is punishable by confinement in jail for not more 
than twelve months and a fine of not more than $2,500, either or both). 
 145. See e.g., Shelter Mortgage, infra note 204 (interpreting the Utah statute as imposing 
personal liability on those who assume to act as a company before LLC is formed). 
 146. See Commentary to Alabama Limited Liability Company Act, ALA. CODE 1975 § 
10-12-7 (“This section is similar to Wyoming’s Limited Liability Company Act (§ 17-15- 
133).”). 
 147. Wyoming enacted the country’s first LLC statute in 1977.  See WYO. STAT. Ann. 
17-15-101 (West 2009) (creating the Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act in 1977). 
 148. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 17, at § 4.15 (noting that such statutory 
provisions do not reflect the more recent trend). 
 149. The states are Colorado: COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-105 (West 2009) (“All 
persons who assume to act as a limited liability company without authority to do so and 
without good faith belief that they have such authority shall be jointly and severally liable 
for all debts and liabilities incurred by such persons so acting.”); Florida:  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
608.4238 (West 2010) (“All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a limited liability 
company, having actual knowledge that there was no organization of a limited liability 
company under this chapter, are jointly and severally liable for all liabilities created while so 
acting except for any liability to any person who also had actual knowledge that there was 
no organization of a limited liability company.”); Kentucky:  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
275.095 (West 2009) (“All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a limited liability 
company, knowing there has been no organization under this chapter, or who assume to act 
for a limited liability company without authority to do so, shall be jointly and severally 
liable for all liabilities created while so acting.”); Oregon:  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.054 
(West 2009) (“All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a limited liability company, 
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have maintained legislative silence on the subject.150 
Similarly, a number of courts have pronounced on the de facto and 
estoppel concepts in relation to LLCs.  From the reported cases, some 
states clearly recognize either or both of the concepts while some take the 
opposite position.  There does not seem to be judicial pronouncements on 
the issue from many other states.  The remaining portions of this part 
survey and analyze judicial decisions on the issue, with Section B 
discussing cases applying either concept, Section C examining cases 
deciding otherwise, and Section D providing a more detailed analysis. 
B. Cases Recognizing De Facto LLC or LLC By Estoppel 
Various courts in numerous states have adopted varying positions in 
relation to pre-formation transactions and obligations pertaining to LLCs. 
Not surprisingly, some courts recognize the de facto doctrine where there 
has been colorable compliance, paralleling the recognition of de facto 
corporations.  Holding that “the de facto corporation doctrine is equally 
applicable to limited liability companies,”151 the appellate division of the 
New York Supreme Court added that to establish that an entity is a de facto 
LLC, there must be a showing that a colorable attempt was made to comply 
with the statute governing the organization of LLCs.152 
Where an LLC was already in legal existence at the time of service of 
court process, but the dispute raged around action taken before the 
Secretary of State accepted the articles of organization, a Connecticut 
superior court took a strong stand for de facto LLCs, drawing insight from 
the analogous concept in corporate law.153  The court noted that it had “not 
 
knowing the limited liability company was not then in existence, are jointly and severally 
liable for all liabilities created while so acting.”). 
 150. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 17, at App. 4-3 (listing the section numbers 
for LLC statutes in the fifty states and indicating which statutes allow for substantial 
compliance).  While Mississippi does not have an assume-to-act provision, its statute 
provides that any person who is required to file a certificate and fails to do may be liable to 
persons adversely affected by the failure to file.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-206. 
 151. In Re. Hausman, 51 A.D.3d 922, 924, 858 N.Y.S.2d 330 (N.Y.S. App. 2008). 
 152. Id. (finding that such an attempt was not made in the instant case prior to the 
purported acceptance of a deed by the LLC, the articles of organization having been filed 
with the Department of State two weeks thereafter).  See also Leber Associates, LLC v. 
Entertainment Group Fund, Inc., No. 00 Civ.3759 LTS MHD, 2003 WL 21750211 
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003) (evincing amenability to applying the de facto and estoppel 
concepts but unable to apply them because sufficient efforts, such as drawing up a 
certificate of formation or attempting to file such a certificate, had not been taken, to confer 
de facto status on the plaintiff and the record before the court raised questions of fact that 
precluded determination of whether the defendants should be stopped from denying that the 
plaintiff was a distinct legal entity). 
 153. Simsbury-Avon Preservation Society, LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., No. 
CV040834190S, 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 726, 2004 WL 2094933 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 
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been advised by the parties of any reason why the same considerations 
[applicable to de facto corporations] ought not to apply to limited liability 
companies, especially where the prejudice would appear to be nil.”154  It 
follows that where an attempt was made at formal registration, but some 
defect in the articles of organization prevented the formal formation of the 
LLC, some courts will be sympathetic to preserving contractual 
undertakings, reminiscent of the de facto corporation experience.155 
Even when there was no colorable compliance before the contract, 
some courts have also shown amenability to the de facto and estoppel 
concepts.  In some of these cases, the LLC was eventually formally 
organized, which might have been an important factor in the decision, but 
lack of eventual organization has not been a complete bar to recognition.  
Where an LLC entered into a residential lease with the defendant on April 
29, 2006 but did not file articles of organization until August 2, 2006, the 
court applied the rule relating to de facto corporations and corporations by 
estoppel to the transaction.156  The court noted that based on the allegations 
in the case, “the defendant transacted business with [the LLC] SWEM prior 
to SWEM’s incorporation [sic], and, as such, the defendant should be 
stopped from denying SWEM’s existence.”157 
In another case, the creditor alleged that he extended a loan to the 
LLC on October 10, 1995.158  The LLC organizer signed the note on behalf 
of the company, representing that the LLC was already in existence at the 
time of the loan.  However, the LLC was not registered with the Florida 
Secretary of State until March 7, 1996.159  The creditor maintained in his 
complaint that he did not know that the LLC had not been created at the 
time of the loan.  Based on that, he wanted to hold the organizer personally 
liable for the loan but the organizer raised three affirmative defenses, based 
on his allegation that the creditor “knew about the company’s status when 
the note was delivered . . . and had participated as an agent, officer, or 
 
2004). 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Allen v. Scott, Hewitt and Mize, LLC, 186 S.W.3d 782, 784 (Mo. Ct. App. 
W.D. 2006), transfer denied, (Feb. 28, 2006) and transfer denied, (Apr. 11, 2006) 
(considering the formation issues to be irrelevant in holding that it was “of no consequence 
to the [vendors] that [the organizer] assigned his interest to an entity that, because of a 
defect in its organizational paperwork, had not finished the organizational process,”  adding 
that the LLC was capable of receiving a valid conveyance despite the fact that it had not 
completed the process of organization, and further holding that the vendors “cannot 
challenge the transfer on the basis that [the LLC] was not yet a de jure entity”). 
 156. DEA & Associates, LLC v. McCall, No. CVH-7482, 2007 WL 117487 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2007). 
 157. Id. at *3. 
 158. Ruggio v. Vining, 755 So.2d 792, 793 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
 159. Id. 
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representative of the unformed LLC in 1995 and 1996.”160 
In amending a previously denied motion for summary judgment, the 
creditor relied in part on the provision of the Florida LLC statute (since 
replaced) that provided that “[a]ll persons who assume to act as a limited 
liability company without authority to do so shall be jointly and severally 
liable for all debts and liabilities.”161  Interestingly, the loan agreement in 
the case predated the current version of the Florida LLC statute that, in 
amending the earlier version, expressly imposes personal liability only on 
persons with actual knowledge of the lack of organization of an LLC.162  
Yet the court interpreted the earlier provision broadly and permitted the 
application of the notion of LLC by estoppel, despite the “statutory 
silence.”163  In a later case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
relied on this decision to hold that “Florida law permits the application of 
de facto corporation and corporation by estoppel to LLCs.”164 
In a bankruptcy proceeding, it was moved that because the debtor was 
never registered under the laws of the State of Connecticut, it was a non-
existent entity, and therefore not a person qualified to be a debtor under 
Section 109(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.165  The debtor conceded it had no 
official, or de jure, existence on the Petition Date, but argued that 
Connecticut law would regard the entity as a de facto LLC under the 
principles established for corporations.166  It supported its claim with the 
fact that it had conducted business in good faith under the name “4 Whip 
LLC” mistakenly believing that formation documents had been submitted 
to, and approved by, the Connecticut Secretary of State.167  The U.S. 
Bankruptcy court concluded that there was sufficient room under the 
Bankruptcy Code’s qualification criteria for permitting an inchoate or de 
facto LLC such as 4 Whip to be a debtor, and thus entitled to bankruptcy 
relief, so long as that entity had a bona fide business existence prior to the 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 794. 
 162. See infra note 242. 
 163. Ruggio v. Vining, 755 So.2d at 795.  See also VGY Development, LLC v. 376 
South Colony Realty Corp., 43 Conn. L. Rptr. 459, 2007 WL 1675090 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
2007) (declining to void a contract entered into by an unformed LLC, stating that “[t]he 
contract was entered into on behalf of the plaintiff by a natural person who presumably had 
the capacity to do so, and, accordingly, the contract is not void from its inception” and 
further holding that once the LLC was formed under Connecticut law it had the requisite 
standing to bring suit). 
 164. Western Securities Corporation v. Eternal Technologies Group, Inc., 2008 WL 
5212386 (C.A.5 (Tex.) 2008). 
 165. In re 4 Whip, LLC, 332 B.R. 670, 45 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 168 (Bankr. D. Conn. 
2005). 
 166. Id. at 671. 
 167. Id. 
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petition date.168 
 Some courts may also be willing to recognize de facto LLCs, and 
thereby provide protection from personal liability and validity to pre-
formation transactions, where the organizers enter into the transactions on 
behalf of an LLC they did not know has not been properly organized. The 
flip side is that where they had such knowledge, they are likely to be held 
personally liable and the transaction invalidated.  This result was reached in 
a case where a commercial landlord filed action against an LLC, as tenant, 
and against the LLC’s members, seeking to collect use and occupancy 
payments for a five-month period following the expiration of a lease, and to 
collect damages for defendants’ failure to clear, grade, pave, and fence the 
lot as agreed upon in the lease.169  The LLC was not in existence at the time 
of contract and members signed the lease in their individual names, 
although a notary’s attestation stated that they were doing business as 
“Fairfield County Paving & Construction, Inc.”170  There was no 
corporation by that name at that time, but an LLC in the same name was 
eventually duly registered.  The court held that since the members entered 
into the contract knowing that there was no properly organized LLC, they 
were personally liable.171  This position is consistent with the provisions of 
MBCA § 2.04 that is acknowledged as permitting the application of the de 
facto and estoppel concepts.172 
Where a party accepts benefits under a contract with an unformed 
LLC, the lack of proper organization may not suffice to void the 
transaction.  Instead, the doctrine of estoppel will likely be deployed to 
decide the case against that party.  In one case, the owner of an apartment 
complex entered into an agreement for the purchase and sale thereof with a 
business that had not been registered as an LLC at the time of contract.   
Nevertheless, it was identified in the contract as an LLC.173  The vendor 
attempted to back out of the contract and brought suit contending that the 
LLC lacked capacity to contract.174  The LLC countered that the vendor 
was precluded from raising the want of legal organization as a defense to 
the parties’ agreement and was estopped to deny the validity of the 
agreement, because it knowingly accepted benefits from the agreement, 
which agreement was not obtained by fraud.175  In addition, after filing its 
 
 168. Id. at 672. 
 169. Mastroianni v. Fairfield County Paving, LLC, 942 A.2d 418, 421 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2008). 
 170. Id. at 424. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 173. Heritage Nat’l Assocs. LP v. 21st Inv. Group LLC, 2000 WL 426437 (Tex. App. 
Dallas), at *1. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at *2. 
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articles of organization, the LLC adopted the agreement.176  The court noted 
that the vendor knowingly received and accepted benefits from the parties’ 
agreement – $25,000 in earnest money pursuant to the agreement.177  
Further noting that the Oklahoma LLC Act categorically declares that the 
law of estoppel applies to the Act, the court held that “in Oklahoma, a party 
who knowingly receives and accepts benefits from a real estate contract, 
absent a showing of fraud, is estopped to deny the validity of the 
contract.”178 
Similarly, another court held that since the parties were fully aware of 
plans to register the business as an LLC, and since the contract was 
partially performed by the LLC and was adopted by it soon after it became 
a registered LLC, the defendant was “estopped from denying existence of 
the limited liability corporation (LLC) [sic] and thus did not have right to 
withdraw from contract with LLC before LLC had been incorporated 
[sic].”179  Nonetheless, a court may insist that a condition for holding the 
other party to the bargain is that the LLC eventually comes into 
existence.180  That conclusion was reached in a case where the appellee 
sought to rescind the agreement to sell a horse stable to an LLC based upon 
the fact that the LLC had not been properly organized under West Virginia 
law as a limited liability company, contending that it had not entered into a 
binding contract with a competent party since the LLC did not technically 
exist at the time the deed was signed.181  Relying on some earlier cases 
from outside West Virginia,182 the court held that provided the entity is 
eventually created and receives delivery of the deed after its creation, “a 
deed drawn and executed in anticipation of the creation of the grantee as a 
corporation, limited liability company, or other legal entity entitled to hold 
real property is not invalidated because the grantee entity had not been 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at *3. 
 178. Id.  See also Heritage Nat’l Assoc.s LP v. 21st Investment Group LLC, No. 05-99-
00317-CV, 2000 WL 862811 (Tex. App. Dallas June 29, 2000) (holding that plaintiff 
suffered no damage or injury from defendant’s delayed legal organization and therefore 
could not succeed on a fraud claim). 
 179. See also P.D. 2000, LLC v. First Fin. Planners, Inc., 998 S.W.2d 108, 110-111 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1999) (holding in relation to a contract that was entered into before the registration 
of the LLC, but in which it was specifically mentioned that the organizer was in the process 
of establishing the LLC and the LLC eventually adopted the contract, that the LLC was 
entitled to recover damages under the contract based on the doctrine of estoppel). 
 180. See Heartland, LLC v. McIntosh Racing Stable, LLC, 632 S.E.2d 296 (W. Va. 
2006) (upholding deed notwithstanding LLC did not exist at time of signing but finding 
genuine issue of material fact in legal formation as condition precedent). 
 181. Id. 
 182. In particular, the court relied on P.D. 2000, 998 S.W.2d 108 and Allen v. Scott, 
Hewitt and Mize, L.L.C., 186 S.W.3d 782, 784 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2006), transfer denied, 
(Feb. 28, 2006) and transfer denied, (Apr. 11, 2006). 
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established as required by law at the time of such execution.”183 
There are situations where the courts are disposed to applying the de 
facto or estoppel concepts, or at least open to it, but do not do so because 
the case is decided on other grounds.  In a breach of contract action, the 
plaintiff sued for a return of payment made to the defendant for work that 
the defendant did not complete.184  The defendant claimed that he had no 
personal liability on the basis that the business was conducted through an 
LLC.185  However, the LLC had not been formed at time of contract.186  The 
defendant argued that “he believed he had formed the LLC, [and] when he 
learned, after the suit had been instituted, that the LLC had not been 
registered, he took immediate action to correct the problem and complete 
the registration with the defendant being the sole member.”187  On the other 
hand, plaintiff argued that he thought he was dealing with the defendant 
individually.  The pre-printed form that contained the agreement between 
the parties was headed “Louie’s Tree Service, LLC” but the heading also 
contained the words “Owner: L. D’Amico.”188 
The court declined to rely on a case cited by the defendant where a 
corporation had been dissolved but the third party, unaware of that fact, 
dealt with the corporation and never relied on the individual officers.189  
The court noted that that was “a different scenario than this case where the 
plaintiff, not unreasonably, thought he was dealing with an individual and 
the LLC had not even been established.”190  It concluded that there was 
probable cause to find the defendant individually liable under the facts of 
the case.191  When the case came up for trial,192 the court recited the facts 
germane to the present discussion, which indicated that there was a good 
faith attempt to comply with statutory requirements for registration of an 
LLC, thereby strongly suggesting that a de facto LLC may have existed.193  
 
 183. Heartland, 632 S.E.2d 296 at 303. 
 184. Briga v. D’Amico, No. CV040083317S, 2004 WL 772065, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.  
Mar. 24, 2004). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Briga v. D’Amico, No. CV040083317, 2006 WL 240557 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan 12, 
2006). 
 193. The pertinent facts are as follow: 
Some time prior to November 1, 2000, Louis D’Amico had retained an attorney 
to create a limited liability corporation (LLC); had signed all of the documents 
prepared by the attorney; had paid all of the attorneys fees and filing fees for 
same; had received and reviewed all of the communications from the attorney as 
to the responsibilities and consequences of the existence of an LLC; and had set 
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However, the court held that there was no breach of contract since the 
plaintiff’s additions to the defendant’s proposal constituted a counter-offer 
which the defendant had not accepted and thus there was no contract.194  
Having decided the case on that ground, the court held that it was not 
necessary to decide the issue of the legal status of the defendant.195 
Where loss of de jure status is curable by actions required by a 
separate statutory provision applicable in certain circumstances, the court 
will give effect to it when the statutory conditions are met and protect LLC 
owners from personal liability or validate their transactions. In a pertinent 
case, the LLC placed orders with the plaintiff at various times including a 
period in which its status as an LLC was revoked.  It did not pay plaintiff in 
full for those orders.196  Plaintiff argued that by continuing to do business at 
a time they knew the company’s status was revoked, the defendants were 
personally liable for the company’s obligations.197  The plaintiff anchored 
its argument on the provision of the Nevada statute that “[a]ll persons who 
assume to act as a limited-liability company without authority to do so are 
jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities of the company.”198   
Defendants argued that they were not personally liable because since the 
company’s status had been reinstated, the reinstatement related back to the 
date of the forfeiture of the company’s right to transact business.199   
Relying on another Nevada statutory provision that a reinstatement relates 
back to the date on which the company forfeited its right to transact 
business and reinstates the company’s right to transact business as if such 
right had at all times remained in full force and effect, the court held that 
the defendants were not personally liable for the LLC’s debts.200 
 
up separate bank accounts, letterhead, etc. for the newly created “Louie’s Tree 
Service, LLC.” When Mr. D’Amico was served with this lawsuit, naming him 
individually as a defendant, he learned from his attorney that the filing of the 
LLC had not been accomplished at the office of the Secretary of State for the 
State of Connecticut. The attorney then immediately filed a second set of 
Articles of Organization for “Louie’s Tree Service, LLC.” It is the position of 
Mr. D’Amico that the proper defendant in this action is the de facto limited 
liability corporation [sic] and that he is not personally responsible. 
Id. at 3. 
 194. Id. at *4 
 195. Id. 
 196. Nichiryo America, Inc. v. Oxford Worldwide, LLC, No. 03:07-CV-00335-LRH-
VPC, 2008 WL 2457935, at *3 (D.Nev. June 16, 2008). 
 197. Id. 
 198. NEV.REV.STAT. § 86.361 (2008) (cited in 6ichiryo, 2008 WL 2457935 at *3). 
 199. 6ichiryo, 2008 WL 2457935 at *3. 
 200. Id. 
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C. Cases Rejecting De Facto LLC or LLC By Estoppel 
In some states where the de facto doctrine has been abolished with 
respect to corporations, the courts have held that LLCs are encompassed in 
the abolition.  Thus, where articles of organization were drafted and signed 
but were not filed with the secretary of state, the court noted that the de 
facto corporation doctrine has been abolished in Minnesota and held that 
the prohibition extended to LLCs.201  In the same vein, since the 
corporation by estoppel doctrine was still valid in the state, despite the 
inapplicability of the de facto corporation doctrine, the court was amenable 
to the application of the LLC by estoppel doctrine.202  The court noted, 
however, that “assum[ing], without deciding, that the corporation-by-
estoppel doctrine applies to LLCs,” it would not apply in the instant case 
since the conveyance of the property to the LLC was induced by fraud.203 
Drawing guidance from an earlier Utah case that held that the Utah 
legislature had abrogated the corporation by estoppel doctrine, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that an analogous provision in 
the Utah LLC statute similarly abrogated the concept of LLC by 
estoppel.204  Since the case relied upon by the Tenth Circuit also held that 
the de facto corporation doctrine had been abolished, it follows that de 
facto LLCs also cannot exist under the current statutory scheme in Utah.205 
Addressing the pertinent issue of pre-organization status, a Virginia 
court stated that “Virginia has adopted the Model Business Corporation 
Act, and like other states enacting the Model Business Corporation Act, has 
 
 201. Stone v. Jetmar Properties, LLC, 733 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
 202. Id. at 487. 
 203. Id. at 487-88.  See also Lake State Fed. Credit Union v. Tretsven, No. A07-1542, 
2008 WL 2732111 (Minn. Ct. App. July 15, 2008) (holding that while a bona-fide purchaser 
of real property ordinarily has superior rights to a previous purchaser whose title was not 
recorded, the argument was not availing where the bona fide purchaser was an unregistered 
LLC at the time the property was issued in its name);  Brcka v. Falcon Electric Corp., No. 
C8-00-1434, 2001 WL 641524 (Minn. App. June 12, 2001) (rejecting a corporation by 
estoppel argument because there was no evidence that the parties sought to be estopped did 
anything to hold out or represent the business as an LLC or that the business in any way 
functioned as an LLC while, on the contrary, the evidence in the record showed that when 
the failed incorporation was discovered, the parties agreed to treat the business as a 
partnership). 
 204. Shelter Mortgage Corp. v. Castle Mortgage Company, LC, 117 Fed. Appx. 6, 14 
(C.A. 10 Utah 2004). 
 205. Id.  See also Berrios-Bones v. Nexidis, LLC, No. 2:07CV193DAK, 2007 WL 
3231549 at *10 (D. Utah Oct. 30, 2007) (holding that it was a question of fact as to whether 
liability would be imposed under the Utah statute that states that “all persons who assume to 
act as a company without complying with this chapter are jointly and severally liable for all 
debts and liabilities so incurred” in a case where an allegedly unregistered LLC had 
purchased 100 percent of the membership interest of an existing LLC and assumed control 
of its operations). 
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completely abolished the old common law doctrine of de facto corporate 
existence.”206  Proceeding along that line of reasoning, the court held that as 
a consequence, “Virginia does not recognize the doctrine of de facto 
existence in regards to limited liability companies.”207  The court’s 
pronouncement on the import of the adoption of the Model Business 
Corporation Act on the de facto doctrine is open to question.  Moreover, 
Virginia’s extant corporate statute is based on the current revision of the 
Model Act.  This version is a retreat from previous versions that doubted 
the continued existence of the de facto doctrine or pointedly rejected it.208 
A similar situation appears to have played out in Tennessee, which 
abolished the de facto corporation doctrine under a 1968 Corporations 
statute that was based on an older version of the MBCA,209 but the state has 
since adopted the 1984 version, which, arguably, has restored the doctrine 
in the state.210  Faced with conflicting accounts as to the exact business 
organization that was in the parties’ contemplation, the Tennessee court of 
appeal responded: 
Notwithstanding Ms. Harvey’s assertion, if an entity is operating 
as a business it must exist as some form of entity. Because more 
than one party was an owner, it is clear that International was not 
operating as a sole proprietorship. It is also clear that neither 
party took the steps required under statute to make International a 
limited partnership, limited liability partnership, or a limited 
liability company. Neither party intended International to become 
a corporation, took any steps to register it as such, nor acted as if 
International was a corporation. As such, International was none 
of the business entities listed above. However, International still 
operated as a business and this fact requires this court to 
determine what specific type of entity International operated as 
during this period. The only business entity that this court has not 
yet rejected is that of a partnership.211 
 
 206. Geographic Network Affiliates-Intern., Inc. v. Enterprise for Empowerment 
Foundation at Norfolk State Univ., 68 Va. Cir. 185 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005). 
 207. Id. 
 208. “All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing there was 
no incorporation under this chapter, are jointly and severally liable for all liabilities created 
while so acting except for any liability to any person who also knew there was no 
incorporation.”  VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-622 (2006). Virginia, however, has no similar 
provision for LLCs. 
 209. See Thompson & Green v. Music City Library Co. 683 S.W. 2d 340, 344 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1984) (holding that the de facto corporation doctrine has been abolished by the 
enactment of the Tennessee General Corporations Act of 1968). 
 210. Brandon Bass, Are There De Facto Corporations in Tennessee?, TENNESSEE 
BUSINESS LITIGATION LAW BLOG, http://www.tnbusinesslitigation.com/business-entities-are-
there-de-facto-corporations-in-tennessee.html (last visited July 5, 2009 ). 
 211. Harvey v. Covington, No. M2000-01184-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 120733, at *3 
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Noting that the “intentions, understanding or terminology used by the 
parties is irrelevant to the formation of a partnership,” the court held that 
the business was as a general partnership.212  What is striking is that the 
court completely glossed over the fact that a de facto entity may have 
existed, or that the concept of LLC by estoppel would have barred one 
party from insisting that the business was not an LLC after apparently 
recognizing it as one.  Instead, it chose to focus on the requirements for de 
jure existence.213  The oversight may have been purposeful, however, 
signifying the court’s intention not to apply either defective registration 
doctrine, based on the fact that the same court had declared almost two 
decades earlier that Tennessee had abolished the de facto doctrine for 
corporations.214 
Even in states where the de facto LLC doctrine has been recognized, 
the courts are not always eager to embrace the doctrine, as exemplified by a 
case in which a notice to quit, dated October 11, 2006, was served on the 
defendants on October 12, 2006, but the plaintiff LLC was not organized 
until November 16, 2006.215  The plaintiff maintained that although it had 
not been formally registered with the Secretary of State as an LLC at the 
time it issued a notice to quit and commenced the lawsuit, it was a de facto 
LLC at the time the action commenced.216  The defendant moved to 
dismiss.  Without directly addressing the de facto issue or pointedly 
rejecting it, the court held that “it is clear from the parties’ submissions that 
[the LLC] was not a legal entity in existence at the time the notice to quit 
was issued and at the time this action was commenced.  Therefore, the 
plaintiff lacked the legal capacity to sue prior to November 16, 2006.”217 
While the non-recognition of the de facto or estoppel concept often 
works to the disadvantage of LLC organizers, LLCs’ founding 
entrepreneurs and other investors are also able to use non-recognition to 
their advantage in evading obligations, including governmental regulations.  
A general partnership purported to convey commercial property to an LLC 
that was never registered with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.218   
Subsequently, the “LLC” conveyed the commercial real estate to a third 
party.219  After both conveyances, the Pennsylvania Department of State 
assessed a real estate transfer tax upon the “LLC.”  To avoid paying the 
 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2001) (citations omitted). 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. 
 214. Supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 215. 54-56 Broadway, LLC v. Smithfield Assoc., LLC et al., No. 15549, 2007 WL 
865826, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2007). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at *3. 
 218. Lester Assocs. v. Commonwealth, 816 A.2d 394, 396 (Pa. 2003). 
 219. Id. 
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transfer tax, the “LLC” contended that the deed from the partnership was 
void ab initio and thus, there was no transfer of real estate to justify the 
imposition of the real estate transfer tax.220  It argued that it was not capable 
of taking title at the time of the conveyance and therefore should be under 
no obligation to pay the assessed taxes.221  The court accepted the “LLC’s” 
arguments and declined to accord legal existence to an unformed LLC, 
holding that both the conveyance to the “LLC” and the subsequent 
purported conveyance by the “LLC” were void.222  Accordingly, the court 
found no justification for the imposition of the real estate transfer tax.223 
There may also be some judicial hesitance to dive into a discussion of 
the concepts, unless clearly warranted by the particular dispute before the 
court.  However, there also does not seem to be a rush to pronounce the 
business relationship a “general partnership.”  The Delaware Chancery 
Court, in a case where one party sought to recover on a general partnership 
theory from another when their negotiations to form an LLC failed, was 
content to raise a hypothetical question in a footnote224:  “What if, for 
example, two parties agreed on all material terms of an LLC agreement, 
conducted business in accordance with that agreement for a time, but one 
party later refused to sign the LLC agreement and claimed exclusive rights? 
Might they be deemed general partners?”225  The court, while noting that 
those circumstances were different from the ones presented in the case 
before it, did not proceed further to characterize the relationship described 
as a de facto LLC or LLC by estoppel.  Perhaps, the court chose to 
concentrate its attention on dismissing the claim that the parties formed a 
general partnership instead of pronouncing on issues or arguments not 
before it.226  The court also stated that where it is the clear intention of the 
parties to formalize their business relationship through a written LLC 
agreement, instead of opting for a general partnership, “reality serves as an 
important factor that cuts against concluding that they had earlier formed a 
general partnership because their attempt to forge an agreement on the 
material terms of a written LLC contract eventually came to naught.”227 
 
 220. Id. at 398. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Ramone v. Lang, No. Civ.A. 1592-N, 2006 WL 905347 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2006). 
 225. Id. at *14 n.64. 
 226. This point is underscored by the court’s conclusion to the following effect: “To 
consider Ramone and Lang partners would make it hazardous for businesspersons to agree 
to negotiate the formation of an LLC together without risking a judicial declaration that they 
thereby created a de facto, informal partnership if their negotiations fail.”  Id. 
 227. Id. 
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D. Analysis of Cases 
There is a strong indication that courts faced with pre-organization 
obligations of LLCs are likely to follow the existing direction in their state 
regarding de facto corporations and corporations by estoppel.228  Yet, the 
fact that a state recognizes de facto corporations and corporations by 
estoppel does not necessarily equate to an extension of a similar 
recognition in the case of LLCs.229  For instance, although Kansas’s 
corporate statute left room for the existence of de facto corporations, the 
state’s initial LLC statute seemed to foreclose that possibility.230 
Conversely, it may not be easily assumed that because a state has 
abolished the de facto and estoppel concepts in the corporate context, it has 
automatically done so in the LLC context.  Such an assumption may be 
injurious to the interests of LLC investors in those states and may run 
contra to the evinced intention of the legislature to depart from the 
previously existing direction.  This problem is illustrated by Pound v. 
Airosol Co., a relatively recent decision of the U.S. District Court in 
Kansas in a case involving the application of Colorado law.231  The court 
held that prior to the issuance of a certificate of incorporation under 
Colorado law, there was no corporate entity and that the de facto 
corporation doctrine had been abolished, even if there has been a colorable 
attempt at complying with the statute regulating the formation of 
corporations.232  In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied on Colorado 
decisional law that interpreted the state’s corporations statute.  The 
Colorado statute was based on a version of the MBCA that was generally 
 
 228. See e.g., Shelter Mortgage Corp. v. Castle Mortgage Co., 117 Fed. Appx. 6  
(rejecting both de facto LLC and LLC by estoppel because analogous concepts in the 
corporate context had been have been abolished in Utah); Stone v. Jetmar, 733 N.W.2d 480, 
485-86 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (drawing guidance on the interpretation and application of the 
law governing LLCs from the law governing corporations and concluding that the de facto 
“doctrine has been abolished in the context of business-corporation law and, by extension, 
in the context of LLC law.”); Simsbury-Avon Preservation Society, LLC v. Metacon Gun 
Club, Inc., No. CV040834190S, 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 726, 2004 WL 2094933 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Aug 20, 2004) (finding no sufficient basis for not applying the de facto corporation 
doctrine recognized in Connecticut to a Connecticut LLC); Leber Associates, LLC v. 
Entertainment Group Fund, Inc., No. 00 Civ.3759 LTS MHD, 2003 WL 21750211 
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003) (applying Delaware’s de facto corporation doctrine to a Delaware 
LLC). 
 229. See Darst, supra note 6, at 303, 324 (arguing for legislative amendment to accord 
the treatment available in pre-formation transactions to corporations in Arkansas to LLCs in 
that state); see also Matthews, supra note 30, at 813-14 (predicting the analysis of liability 
under defective formation by analogy to other entity types). 
 230. Darst, supra note 6, at 317-18. 
 231. Pound v. Airosol Co., 368 F.Supp.2d 1210 (D. Kan. 2005). 
 232. Id. 
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seen as abrogating the defective incorporation doctrines.233 
The current version of the statute is substantially different234 and is 
similar to the LLC statute which provides:  “All persons who assume to act 
as a limited liability company without authority to do so and without good 
faith belief that they have such authority shall be jointly and severally 
liable for all debts and liabilities incurred by such persons so acting.”235  
Thus, in enacting a new corporations statute and an LLC statute, the 
Colorado legislature used language that, by shielding organizers from 
personal liability if they had a good faith belief they had the authority to 
act, may be understood as permitting the existence of corporations and 
LLCs that have not satisfied the requisite organizational requirements.236  It 
is expected that a court faced with the interpretation of the Colorado LLC 
statute would hold that the statute permits the existence of de facto LLCs, 
instead of being guided by previous decisions, which held that de facto 
corporation doctrine has been abolished in the state.  Similarly, a court 
presented with the issue in the corporate context is also expected to take the 
legislative change into account. 
It is puzzling that Pound came up after the statutory change and yet 
the court reached a result not dissimilar from the conclusions under the 
previous statutory scheme.  Accordingly, at the earliest opportunity, the 
state’s top court may want to consider overruling the previous decisions 
and restore the recognition of the defective incorporation doctrines. 
Another observation from the cases is that, as has been the case in the 
corporate context, it is possible in some states to recognize LLCs by 
estoppel without according a similar recognition to de facto LLCs.237  
 
 233. Black Canyon Citizens Coalition, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Montrose 
County, 80 P.3d 932, 933 (Colo. App. 2003); Bowers Bldg. Co. v. Altura Glass Co., 694 
P.2d 876 (Colo. App. 1984). 
 234. “All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, without authority to 
do so and without good faith belief that they have such authority shall be jointly and 
severally liable for all liabilities incurred or arising as a result thereof.”  COLO. REV. STAT. § 
7-102-104 (2006). 
 235. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-105 (2006). 
 236. See Sylvester J. Orsi, The Limited Liability Company: An Organizational 
Alternative for Small Business, 70 NEB. L. REV. 150, 154 n.27 (1991) (stating that the 
Colorado LLC statute “grants limited liability to persons who act with an honest, but 
erroneous belief that they had authority to do so.”).  See also BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra 
note 16, ¶ 6.02[2][c][i] (stating that Iowa and Colorado “take a more modern approach by 
adding a scienter requirement”) (citation omitted); Thomas E. Rutledge, Limited Liability 
(or not): Reflections on the Holy Grail, 51 S.D. L. REV. 417, 431 (2006); Scott R. Anderson, 
The Illinois Limited Liability Company: A Flexible Alternative for Business, 25 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 55, 72 n.98 (1993). 
 237. See RAGAZZO & MOLL, supra note 42, at 296 (stating that unlike de facto 
corporations, corporations by estoppel survived the adoption of the Model Act in the District 
of Columbia); Namerdy v. Generalcar Corp., 217 A.2d 109, 112 (D.C. 1966) (upholding the 
defense of corporations by estoppel).  See also Stone v. Jetmar, 733 N.W.2d 480, 487 
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While this situation leaves LLC organizers in a better shape than in 
jurisdictions where there is outright rejection or unavailability of either 
defective registration concept, the protection afforded is still limited.  
Business owners are still exposed to liability in tort and non-voluntary 
transactions, since the estoppel concept does not afford protection from 
personal liability in those circumstances.238  Even in the case of contract, 
escape from personal liability is not assured in all cases.  Where a business 
owner or owners legitimately believe that they were duly registered as an 
LLC (for example, because their attorney who was instructed to register the 
business so informed them) but have not ordered business stationery or 
erected sign posts that have the designation “LLC” after the business name, 
they may be held unlimitedly liable if, during the period of non-
registration, a third party contracts with them believing the business is a 
sole proprietorship (especially if she always met and dealt with one person) 
or a general partnership.  It would be difficult or impossible to sustain an 
argument that estoppel bars the third party from recovering against them 
personally or avoiding the transaction to evade her obligations.  After all, 
the third party did not deal with the business on the understanding that it 
was an LLC, which is the basis of an estoppel defense.  On the other hand, 
if the business is a formally organized LLC or if the de facto LLC doctrine 
is recognized in the jurisdiction, the business owners would be protected 
from personal liability, considering that they made a good faith effort to 
register as an LLC. 
Another crossover from the corporate context is the persisting 
tendency to conclude that because the process of formal organization has 
been simplified and streamlined, it is impossible to satisfy a basic 
prerequisite for the application of the de facto doctrine, namely a colorable 
attempt to comply with the relevant statute.  The Minnesota Court of 
Appeals resorted to this point as a basis for refusing to accord recognition 
to the notion of a de facto LLC.239  According to the court, “the LLC statute 
provides organizers with an indisputably simple route to formal 
organization.  Thus, it is doubtful that one could actually make an 
unsuccessful ‘colorable attempt’ to organize a de jure LLC.”240  However, 
the corporate experience has demonstrated the questionability and futility 
of rejecting the de facto doctrine on that basis.241 
 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting de facto LLC doctrine but leaving room for the application 
of LLC by estoppel, basing both positions on the applicable rules for Minnesota 
corporations). 
 238. RAGAZZO & MOLL, supra note 42, at 292. 
 239. Stone v. Jetmar, 733 N.W.2d at 486. 
 240. Id. at 486 n.2. 
 241. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 50 cmt. (1960) (“Since it is unlikely that any steps 
short of securing a certificate of incorporation would be held to constitute apparent 
compliance, the possibility that a de facto corporation could exist under such a provision is 
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In some of the cases, the courts appear to be open to accepting the de 
facto or estoppel doctrine but constrained to withhold recognition, not 
because of any legal objection, but because under the facts the parties have 
not met the requirements for application of the doctrines,242 or the doctrines 
are not germane to the resolution of the cause at hand. In Briga v. D’Amico, 
the parties entered into a “contract” to clear some land of trees.  The 
defendant contended that his company was a “de facto” LLC.243  The court 
resolved the breach of contract issue by reference to contract law but did 
not pronounce on the issue of de facto LLC.244  This judicial posture of 
openness and absence of outright hostility certainly bodes well for the 
development and widespread recognition of the concepts of de facto LLC 
and LLC by estoppel. 
Finally, it is difficult to establish the significance, or lack thereof, of 
statutory silence in the application or rejection of the de facto and estoppel 
concepts.  For instance, Connecticut and New York do not have assume-to-
act provisions, whether with or without a knowledge requirement.245  A 
number of courts in the two states have applied or approved the application 
of the de facto and estoppel concepts.246  The argument could thus be made 
that while the application of the concepts would be better guaranteed under 
a legislative scheme that expressly provides for no personal liability under 
certain circumstances where pre-formation obligations would arise, it does 
not appear to be particularly harmful that the legislature has chosen to be 
silent on the issue.  Nevertheless, the legislature’s silence may endanger the 
existence of the concepts where the state has settled the issue in the 
corporate context.  One example is Minnesota, where the LLC statute is 
silent but the courts have ruled out the application of the de facto concept 
in the LLC context, while leaving room for LLCs by estoppel, based on the 
state of the corporate law in the state.247  On the other hand, in the two 
states mentioned above, the de facto corporation doctrine is alive, 
explaining why the courts have accepted the doctrine of de facto LLCs.  In 
situations, such as under Utah law, where both the corporate experience 
 
remote.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 146 cmt. (2d ed. 1971) (stating that no reason exists for 
the continuance of the de facto corporation doctrine “under general corporate laws, where 
the process of acquiring de jure incorporation is both simple and clear.”).  The 1984 version 
acknowledged the failure of these efforts and decided to adopt a slightly more flexible or 
relaxed standard.  Supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 242. Leber Associates, LLC v. Entertainment Group Fund, Inc., No. 00 Civ.3759 LTS 
MHD, 2003 WL 21750211 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003). 
 243. Briga v. D’Amico, No. CV040083317S, 2004 WL 772065, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.  
Mar. 24, 2004). 
 244. Id. 
 245. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 17, at Appendix 4-3.  
 246. See supra notes 151–53 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text. 
DURUIGBOFINALIZED_TWO 8/9/2010  11:48 PM 
1056 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:4 
 
and an assume-to-act provision exist, the chances of the survival of the 
doctrines in the LLC context appear to be nil.248  A fair conclusion could be 
that silence does not necessarily count for much, as the corporate 
experience seems to loom large over this issue for LLCs.  A fortiori, the 
case for clear LLC legislative provisions cannot be overemphasized. 
Professors Bishop and Kleinberger, after an extensive review of the 
problems surrounding the de facto concepts in the corporate and LLC 
contexts, made the following conclusion and recommendation: 
For any particular jurisdiction, shield-related rules for 
corporations and for limited liability companies should be 
synchronized. Neither entity should enjoy a shield-related 
advantage or suffer a shield-related disadvantage. Therefore, 
jurisdictions that respect the de facto or estoppel doctrine for 
corporations should do likewise for limited liability companies. 
Jurisdictions that reject those doctrines for corporations should 
likewise reject them for LLCs.249 
This work partially accepts the synchronization proposal.  For reasons 
explained in the next part, I argue that the laws should be synchronized to 
favor the application of de facto and estoppel concepts to LLCs.   
Accordingly, any state that opts to recognize either or both of the concepts 
in the LLC context should harmonize its corporate law to align with this 
position.  States that already recognize the concepts in the corporate 
context but have an opposite provision for LLCs or have not made an 
explicit provision one way or another in the LLC context should 
synchronize their laws to recognize de facto LLCs and LLCs by estoppel.250  
Part IV below presents a more detailed proposal for legislative reform in 
favor of the application of the de facto and estoppel concepts in the LLC 
context. 
V. A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
Many states impose personal liability on those who conduct business 
as an LLC prior to formation through what has been referred to as ‘assume-
to-act’ or ‘purporting-to-act’ provisions.251  For instance, the Alabama LLC 
 
 248. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text. 
 249. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 16, ¶ 6.02 [2][d][iii], at 10. 
 250. According to one commentator: “Thirty-two states contain statutes similar to either 
the 1969 or the 1984 Model Act, and twelve contain a similar provision in their LLC 
statutes. . . . [T]he pre-organization provisions for corporations and LLCs do not always go 
hand in hand. A state may have the 1984 version for corporations and the 1969 version for 
the LLC, such as Arizona and Alabama. Alternatively, a state, for example Arkansas, may 
have a statute for one entity and not the other.” Darst, supra note 6, at 317 (citations 
omitted). 
 251. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 17, at § 4:15.  Some other states have 
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statute provides:  “All persons who assume to act as a limited liability 
company without authority to do so shall be jointly and severally liable for 
all debts and liabilities created by their so acting.”252 
Although some assume-to-act provisions (in the corporate context) 
have been liberally construed to exclude passive investors253 and to require 
some level of culpability,254 a preferable approach would be to exclude 
clearly from personal liability two categories of investors: those who are 
not aware of the lack of registration as an LLC and those who are not active 
participants in the business.255  This just result can be accomplished by 
incorporating a knowledge component in the assume-to-act provisions.256  
An example of this latter approach can be found in the revised Florida LLC 
Statute which provides: 
All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of [an LLC], having 
actual knowledge that there was no organization of [an LLC] 
under this chapter, are jointly and severally liable for all 
liabilities created while so acting except for any liability to any 
person who also had actual knowledge that there was no 
organization of [an LLC].257 
Along similar lines, this work proposes that state LLC statutes 
incorporate a provision that imposes no personal liability unless there is 
knowledge of the lack of registration by those actively involved in the 
 
declined to follow that course.  Id. 
 252. ALA. CODE § 10-12-7 (2009).  
 253. See, e.g., Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 514 P.2d 1109, 1113-14 (Ore. 1973) 
(stating that “the category of ‘persons who assume to act as a corporation’ does not include 
those whose only connection with the organization is as an investor . . . [but does] include 
those persons who have an investment in the organization and who actively participate in 
the policy and operational decisions”). 
 254. See e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Thoss, 385 So. 2d 726 (Fla. App. 1980); Harry Rich 
Corp. v. Feinberg, 518 So. 2d 377, 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (construing assume-to-act 
as not imposing personal liability in the absence of actual or constructive knowledge on the 
part of the defendant that there had been no incorporation).  See also U. S. Fid. & Guar. 
Corp. v. Putzy, 613 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (stating that “only incorporators or others 
who actively conduct corporate business can be held liable for the debts of the corporation 
at common law”). 
 255. Roland J. Santoni, Why 6ebraska Should Adopt the Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 149, 152 (1994) (stating that under a purporting to 
act provision with a scienter requirement, “passive investors in a corporation avoid the risk 
of personal liability for pre-incorporation transactions, as do other active participants who 
honestly and reasonably, but erroneously, believe that articles of incorporation had been 
filed”). 
 256. See Task Force Report: Oregon Revised Model Business Corporation Act, 30 
WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 407, 418 (1994) (stating that the inclusion of a knowledge component 
“protects participants who act honestly but subject to the mistaken belief that the articles 
have been filed”). 
 257. FLA. STAT. ANN. §608.4238 (West 2010). 
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running of the purported LLC.258  That way, the law punishes only those 
who clearly intend to skirt the provisions of the LLC statute or are 
egregiously indifferent to the law’s dictates.  This proposal, therefore, is 
along the lines of the current state of corporate law under the MBCA as 
adopted by numerous states.259  Furthermore, those who present an 
unorganized business as an LLC, or enter into transactions with it on that 
understanding, should not be provided an escape valve to avoid their 
obligations when the circumstances turn unpalatable.  In addition, those 
who act on behalf of an LLC knowing there is no formal organization will 
always be personally liable for obligations arising in tort or non-voluntary 
aspects of a contractual transaction.  Also, the only time such people will 
be protected in contract is when the third party clearly knew it was dealing 
with an LLC and expressly or tacitly chose to make the LLC the sole 
obligor.260  Section A below elaborates on the rationale for this proposal 
and Section B presents a taxonomy of applicable situations, while Section 
C provides a forceful critique. 
A. Rationale for Proposal 
This paper has developed a seven-fold rationale for recognizing the 
estoppel and de facto concepts in the context of LLCs.  Recognizing these 
concepts in the limited circumstances proposed here will promote statutory 
compliance, provide creditor protection, secure land titles, reduce investor 
risk, obviate incommensurate punishment, prevent windfall profits and 
ensure prudence in the design and implementation of business policy. 
1. Compliance Promotion 
A major goal of not recognizing de facto and estoppel concepts is to 
ensure compliance with statutory provisions on registration by not lending 
 
 258. At the moment, similar to the situation with corporations, some LLC statutes 
incorporate a knowledge component to their purporting-to-act provisions, while some others 
do not or leave the issue entirely open.  Dennis S. Karjala, Planning Problems in the Limited 
Liability Company, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 455, 464 n.36 (1995). 
 259. See Mitchell F. Crusto, Green Business: Should we Revoke Corporate Charters for 
Environmental Violations, 63 LA. L. REV. 175, 187 (2003) (discussing the MBCA provision 
on this point); John Morey Maurice, The 1990 Washington Business Corporation Act, 25 
GONZ. L. REV. 373, 385 (1990) (stating that the purporting to act provision adopted in the 
state of Washington “does not apply to persons who do not know that the corporation does 
not yet exist”). 
 260. See Levinsohn, supra note 21, at 287 (suggesting that in order to successfully raise 
an estoppel, there should be “a showing that the associates assumed to do business as a 
corporation and the third person, as a reasonable man, understood that he was dealing with 
the association as a corporation”). 
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credibility to those in non-compliance.261  Such a rigid stance, however, 
achieves unfair results and has proven unworkable in many cases.  The 
proposed approach will address the compliance issue in a good number of 
cases.  It may not accomplish the envisaged complete compliance objective 
of assume-to-act provisions lacking a knowledge component, but it also 
does not drastically undermine compliance through an endorsement of 
blanket immunity for those who incur pre-formation obligations. 
2. Creditor Protection 
The registration of LLCs provides notice to third parties of the status 
of the company, the individuals behind the business and the level of their 
financial involvement in the entity.262  Information of this nature could 
provide a level of protection as it enables potential creditors to act on an 
informed basis and decide if it is worthwhile to expose themselves to the 
risk of doing business with a particular company.  In view of the fact that 
the proposal here generally supports formal registration as opposed to a 
proposal that grants the benefit of registration in more generous situations 
to those who have not made efforts to register as an LLC, the present 
proposal could be seen as aiding creditor protection unlike one alternative 
that grants blanket immunity for those who incur preformation obligations. 
3. Title Security 
Additional justification for the application of the de facto concept to 
LLCs can be found in the fact that it can ensure that land titles are secure, 
instead of unduly placing transferees in jeopardy and unnecessarily 
increasing the workload of public officials.263  De facto corporations have 
 
 261. 1 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN.  § 2.04, official cmt. at 2-46, illustration 4 (3d ed. 
Supp. 1997) (stating that “to recognize limited liability in this situation threatens to 
undermine the incorporation process, since one may obtain limited liability by consistently 
conducting business in the corporate name.”); Dodd, supra note 73, at 551, 557. 
 262. See CALLISON AND SULLIVAN, LLCs, supra note 140. 
The various state LLC statutes differ concerning the information which must be 
provided in the LLC’s article of organization . . . . Some states require less 
information than others, and filing information can be limited to such matters as 
the LLC’s name and the name and address of its registered agent. Other statutes 
require more information, such as a statement of the LLC’s business purpose, its 
duration, a disclosure of whether the LLC will be managed by its members or 
managers, information concerning the members and/or the managers, 
limitations on the managers’ or members’ powers to bind the LLC to third 
parties, the contributions made or to be made by members, the right to admit 
additional members, and other information concerning the LLC and its finances. 
 263. See 2 PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 406 (3d ed. June 2009) (stating that 
an LLC would be able to acquire title to land if the courts construe LLC statutes similarly to 
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long been permitted to hold and convey title to property.264  They may also 
bring an action to eject strangers to their title or sue trespassers in tort.265  
This practice would be extended to de facto LLCs where the concept is 
recognized.266  Speculating on what some state courts would do, one 
commentator asserts: 
[I]t would be unreasonably burdensome to require that the title 
searcher examine the Secretary of State’s records for each limited 
liability company in a chain of title to determine its legal 
existence at the time of conveyance. It is probable that the 
concept of a de facto LLC would be applied by Vermont courts 
to deal with the problem of acquisition of title to real property by 
an LLC which initial articles of organization had not been filed 
with or accepted by the Secretary of State at the time of a 
conveyance into a purported LLC. Similarly, a conveyance by an 
LLC of property in its name where the LLC had not been 
properly formed, or which having been properly formed, had 
been dissolved, raises the same question as in the corporate 
context. It would seem reasonable and practical to assume that 
courts would apply a de facto LLC doctrine to recognize the 
validity of such conveyances.267 
 In Allen v. Scott, Hewitt and Mize, LLC., the Missouri Court of 
Appeals held that an LLC was capable of receiving a valid conveyance 
irrespective of the fact that it had not completed the organization process, 
adding that a subsequently formed entity may have equitable rights with 
regard to a conveyance made before its formation.268  In the Matter of 
Hausman, the appellate division of the New York Supreme Court 
concluded that a de facto LLC can take title to property.269  However, it 
held that no de facto LLC existed at the time the deed in question was 
executed since there was no colorable attempt to comply with the statute 
 
corporate law by recognizing de facto LLCs in cases of defective formation or involuntary 
dissolution, adding that “[t]his reasoning would permit only the state to raise defects in 
forming and constituting the company as grounds to question its capacity to acquire title”) 
(citation omitted). 
 264. JOHN L. SOILEAU & G. ROBERT ARNOLD, FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES 
TRANSACTIONS § 6.53 (2004) (“Originally, a conveyance to and from a de facto corporation 
was considered a valid conveyance.”). 
 265. Levinsohn, supra note 21, at 290. 
 266. See 16 N.Y. JUR. 2D BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS § 2156 (May 2009) (stating that the 
recognition in New York that an unincorporated entity can take title to real property is 
equally applicable to LLCs, provided that a colorable attempt was made to comply with the 
statute governing organization prior to the purported acceptance of the deed). 
 267. Anderson, Title Issues, supra note 19, at 161. 
 268. Allen v. Scott, Hewitt and Mize, LLC, 186 S.W.3d 782, 784 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 
2006), transfer denied, (Feb. 28, 2006) and transfer denied, (Apr. 11, 2006). 
 269. In Re. Hausman, 51 A.D.3d 922, 924, 858 N.Y.S.2d 330 (N.Y.S.App. 2008). 
DURUIGBOFINALIZED_TWO 8/9/2010  11:48 PM 
2010] AVOIDING A LIMITED FUTURE 1061 
 
governing the organization of LLCs.270  Allowing putative LLCs to hold 
property is also important for the protection of the interest of innocent third 
parties who have relied in good faith on the LLC’s ownership of the 
property.271 
 An objection to allowing de facto LLCs to hold property is the 
conflict it engenders with a public policy of encouraging entities to be 
properly organized.  As the court reasoned in Stone v. Jetmar,272 
“[a]llowing a form of future interest to vest in unorganized entities would 
be inconsistent with our public policy of encouraging legal 
organization.”273  On the other hand, a credible point can be made that a 
public policy that favors the holding and conveyance of property by de 
facto LLCs is founded upon considerations of necessity, for the protection 
of the public and individuals whose interests otherwise may be adversely 
affected.274  Thus, it is to a reasonable extent an analogue of the doctrine 
that confers validity to the acts of officers de facto, regardless of any 
defects that may exist pertaining to the legality of their appointment or 
election.275  A little more than a century ago, Professor Edward Warren 
 
 270. Id. at 924l; but see Stone v. Jetmar Properties, LLC, 733 N.W.2d 480, 486 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a deed conveying property to an unregistered LLC was void); 
Lake State Fed. Credit Union v. Tretsven, No. A07-1542, 2008 WL 2732111 (Minn. App. 
July 15, 2008) (holding that an unregistered LLC could not claim a mortgage interest in 
property issued in its name prior to registration).  
 271. See KALINKA, supra note 19, at § 1.37 (stating that “where third parties have relied 
in good faith on the LLC’s ownership of an immovable [property], a court might apply an 
estoppel theory to validate the LLC’s transactions with respect to the property”). 
 272. Stone v. Jetmar, 733 N.W.2d at 487. 
 273. Id.; Lake State Fed. Credit Union, 2008 WL 2732111, at *3. 
 274. See Jordan v. Knox County, 213 S.W.3d 751, 774 (Sup. Ct. Tenn. 2007) 
(referencing a U.S. Supreme Court opinion making a similar point in relation to de facto 
officers). 
 275. Id.  The recognition for de facto officers is limited, however, as inquiries into the 
legality of their appointment may still continue under proper proceeding while their acts are 
recognized.  In the case of de facto corporations or LLCs holding or conveying title, 
establishing that they are de facto entities would end the inquiry.  Nonetheless, the effect on 
the issue of holding title is similar.  Just as titles by de facto entities are recognized, acts of 
de facto officers (even if removed eventually) may still remain valid.  As the Tennessee 
Supreme Court remarked about the actions of a sheriff who lacked eligibility to serve: 
At the time the deed was executed . . . Newman was the acting sheriff of the 
county under an election made in due form; and although he was, at the time of 
his election, ineligible on account of his defalcation, yet this does not avoid his 
acts done as sheriff before his election was annulled by the proper authority; 
previous to the event, though he was not sheriff de jure, yet he was de facto; and 
from public necessity, the acts of a public officer, exercising his office de facto, 
though not de jure, are valid as to third persons, and cannot be controverted in a 
collateral issue such as this. 
Bates v. Dyer, 28 Tenn. (9 Hum.) 162, 163 (1848) (quoted in id. at 775).  Another difference 
is that the de facto officer doctrine is applied for the benefit of those dealing with such 
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remarked:  “The considerations of public policy moving the courts to 
facilitate [real estate] transactions may not be so urgent as those respecting 
transactions with public officers, but they have great force.”276 
 When the application of the ultra vires doctrine started jeopardizing 
the security of land titles, among other problems, the accompanying 
concern contributed to a reform of the doctrine.277  Today, the influence of 
the ultra vires doctrine has been dramatically diminished to the point of 
near irrelevance.278  A similar concern may strengthen the case for de facto 
LLCs and torpedo the support for contrary positions. 
4. Fitting Punishment 
A fair system of justice should always strive to make the punishment 
fit the prohibited conduct or ensure that the recompense does not unduly 
exceed the loss.279  While it may accord with our notion of justice to impose 
personal liability for those who deliberately decide to ignore legal 
requirements for registration, such a response is out of proportion for those 
who exhibit slight sloppiness at some point in the registration process.  
“The de facto incorporation concept was invented as a fairness mechanism 
to mitigate the harshness that often resulted when unbeknownst to 
 
officers and cannot be relied on by the officers to enforce a right incident to the office nor 
does it protect the officer from tort committed in the course of official acts.  See Warren I, 
supra note 88, at 458.  For a useful discussion of the foundation and limits of the de facto 
officer doctrine, see Charles W. Tooke, De Facto Municipal Corporations Under 
Unconstitutional Statutes, 37 YALE L.J. 935, 942-48 (1928). 
 276. Warren I, supra note 88, at 457. 
 277. RAGAZZO AND MOLL, supra note 42, at 297.  See also Henry Winthrop Ballantine, A 
Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 381 (1934) 
(discussing the issue of the near demise of the doctrine and a particular case where a party 
who had received the benefits of a loan was able to use the defense to stop a corporation 
from realizing on the security for an ultra vires loan, effectively amounting to an unjust 
forfeiture). 
 278. See Stephen J. Leacock, The Rise and Fall of the Ultra Vires Doctrine in United 
States, United Kingdom, and Commonwealth Caribbean Corporate Common Law: A 
Triumph of Experience Over Logic, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L. J. 67 (2006) (surveying the 
legal position in several countries and discussing the decline of the ultra vires doctrine). 
 279. In the criminal context, this is encapsulated in the concept of proportionality.  For 
interesting discussions of proportionality and retributive justice, see Morris J. Fish, An Eye 
for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
57, 69 (2008) (examining mandatory minimum sentencing and its effect on the 
proportionality of punishment); Rachel King, 6o Due Process: How the Death Penalty 
Violates The Constitutional Rights of the Family Members of Death Row Prisoners, 16 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 195, 221-225 (2007) (noting that the death penalty’s proportionality problems 
fail the goals of retributive justice); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive 
Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 318-320 (2009) (noting the 
comparative advantages of punitive damages in furthering the interests of retributive 
justice). 
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stockholders, their company failed to achieve de jure corporate status 
because one of the numerous, complicated requirements for incorporation 
prescribed by early corporation acts remained unsatisfied.”280  Similar 
considerations of justice animate the corporation by estoppel doctrine.281 
Notwithstanding that the registration process has been greatly 
simplified, it remains a fact of life that errors are inadvertently made, as we 
continue to see in the incorporation and registration processes.282  The de 
facto corporation concept still has a role in fulfilling its original mission of 
ensuring fairness and mitigating harsh punishment.283  The proposal here 
promotes justice by not overly punishing sloppy attention to detail.284  It 
also advances the notion and cause of justice by preventing third parties 
from using the lack of formal registration as a sword to escape liability 
after deriving benefits from the contract with the purported LLC.285 
5. Risk Reduction 
A related point is that a stringent approach that leaves no room for 
mistakes only escalates the risk of doing business in the LLC form.  
Contending that any remedy for doing business as an informal LLC should 
be imposed only on those knowingly evading the statute, Ribstein and 
Keatinge note that “[i]mposing strict or negligence-based liability on 
passive members who relied on others to make the filing increases the risk, 
and therefore the cost, of engaging in this form of business.”286  This 
situation is troubling, considering that the costs facing these investors “may 
outweigh any benefit to creditors from imposing this liability on innocent 
or merely unwary members, especially if the creditor was not misled by the 
failure to file.”287  A purporting-to-act provision that incorporates a 
knowledge component as proposed here will address the problem and 
ensure that more risk-averse and cautious investors are not driven away 
from the LLC business form.  Considering that many of the defectively 
 
 280. Marc R. Lieberman, The Happy Demise of Constructive Incorporation, 22-NOV. 
ARIZ. B.J. 22, 22 (1986). 
 281. SMITH AND WILLIAMS, supra note 28, at 147 (stating that “the concepts of ‘de facto 
corporation’ and ‘corporation by estoppel’ were created by courts to deal with potential 
inequities that sometimes result from a failure to incorporate”). 
 282. Supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 283. See Breeze, supra note 56, at 3 (stating that the de facto corporation doctrine 
originated from a recognition of the hardship that attended holding business associates 
personally liable when they have made a good faith attempt to limit their liability). 
 284. For a contrary view, see Waddoups, supra note 8, at 312. 
 285. See Boslow Family Limited Partnership v. Glickenhaus & Co., 7 N.Y.3d 664, 668 
(N.Y. 2006) (making a similar point in the context of limited partnerships). 
 286. RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE, supra note 17, at § 4: 15. 
 287. Id. 
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formed LLCs are likely to be small business outfits,288 and given the 
importance of small business to job creation and general economic 
growth,289 it will serve the society better to have a policy approach that 
does not drive entrepreneurs out of business by increasing the risk attendant 
upon organizing a business in this form.290 
6. Windfall Profits 
Writing in the corporate and limited partnership context, some 
scholars have made a forceful contention that no personal liability should 
attach to an investor where the creditor’s negotiation was on the 
assumption that the other party was a corporation or had limited liability 
protection.291  This position has provided a strong basis for arguing for the 
application of the de facto doctrine.  According to one legal scholar, the 
rationale is anchored on the discomfort that stems from the import of 
imposing full personal liability on the business owners, that is, a windfall 
for the other party to the contract.292  “As long as the creditor thought it was 
 
 288. The quest for a clear definition of the term “small business” has proven elusive.  
See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 4, at 6-7 (discussing the lack of a standard definition and listing 
various businesses that qualify as small business, including builders, mechanics, restaurants, 
retail stores, local laundry services, hairdressers, corner bakeries, auto dealerships, start-up 
companies and service firms). 
 289. See Scott Crist, State’s CAPCO Program Generates Follow-on Funds, HOUS. 
CHRON. (May 22, 2009), at B11 (stating that “according to the United States Small Business 
Administration, small businesses have created 60 to 80 percent net new jobs in the U.S. over 
the past dozen years”). 
 290. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 4, at 4 (“Today, small firms employ half of the work 
force, generate almost all of the net new jobs, and produce 50% of the nation’s GDP. They 
have adjusted to new economic conditions by developing market niches, and serving as 
intermediate suppliers to larger firms.”); James W. Lovely, Agency Costs, Liquidity, and the 
Limited Liability Company as an Alternative to the Close Corporation, 21 STETSON L. REV. 
377, 377 (1992) (discussing the role of small business enterprises in job creation, innovation 
and economic growth). 
 291. See Bradley, supra note 8, at 580 (urging the courts to give consideration to the 
parties intent and to stop awarding profits to plaintiffs that did not expect them when they 
were contracting).  Discussing the issue in the limited partnership context, Professor Fessler 
observes that there are: 
. . . two irreconcilable lines of judicial reasoning. One stresses the theme that 
limited partnerships are the creature of statutory law, and concludes that the 
benefit and protections of that association may be claimed only by those who 
have complied with the relevant statutes. The expectations of creditors are 
irrelevant since limited liability is not conferred by contract but results from a 
statutory status. The contrary authorities argue that creditor expectations, not 
abstract notions of public policy, should govern individual liability claims. 
Daniel Fessler, Alternatives to Incorporation for Persons in Quest of Profit 229 (3d ed. 
1991). 
 292. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 48, at 23. 
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dealing with a de jure corporation, the firm’s defective incorporation is 
irrelevant.  Personal liability would constitute a windfall the creditor did 
not expect and has done nothing to earn.”293 
 The same argument has also provided justification for the 
application of the estoppel concept.294  In Pharmaceutical Sales & 
Consulting Corp. v. J.W.S. Delavau Co.,295 notwithstanding that there had 
been no application for a certificate of incorporation at the time of 
transaction, the court took the position that the business could sue as a 
corporation for breach of contract to prevent the defendant from escaping 
potential liability, amounting to “a windfall [that was not] expected at the 
time of the execution of the contract.”296  This approach has a lot to 
commend it, particularly the fact that it “is premised upon the courts’ desire 
to effectuate the parties’ intent in entering into the contractual arrangement 
at issue.”297 
The windfall profits argument presents an attractive basis for applying 
the de facto and estoppel concepts, yet, the matter is much more 
complicated than that.  The argument appears not to recognize that there 
are other interests involved in the issue of incorporation or registration.  
While the argument ensures that the court does justice between the parties, 
the court’s duty goes beyond that narrow confine of ensuring a just 
outcome to include a commitment to applying existing law.298  The 
government also has an economic interest in ensuring that the benefit of 
limited liability is enjoyed only by those who have accepted the 
corresponding burden of payment of filing fees and franchise taxes to the 
state.  Favoring compliance with statutory requirements is also a 
worthwhile governmental objective.  Permitting those in non-compliance to 
be treated the same as those who have complied does not send a message 
that non-compliance is discouraged.  In fact, some courts have clearly taken 
the stance that public policy encourages legal organization, and 
consequently are not willing to adopt a position that is inconsistent with 
 
 293. Id. 
 294. See id. at 24 (stating that courts developed the corporation by estoppel doctrine to 
deal with cases in which no good faith effort has been made to incorporate the business but 
“imposing full personal liability on the firm’s would-be shareholders gives the other party to 
the transaction a windfall”). 
 295. Supra note 52. 
 296. Id. at 407. 
 297. Payer v. The SGL Carbon, LLC et al., No. 05-CV-0226E(F), 2006 WL 2714190 
(W.D.N.Y Sep. 22, 2006), at *5.  See also Bradley, supra note 8, at 580 (“The Georgia 
courts should use this opportunity to put equitable considerations back into the application 
of this doctrine, to take the intent of the parties into consideration, and to stop providing 
windfalls to plaintiffs who sue defective corporations.”). 
 298. See Warren II, supra note 88, at 313 (“If a court felt justified in taking note of 
nothing but the considerations of fairness between the parties to this particular suit, the 
argument might be allowed to prevail.”). 
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this policy.299  Nevertheless, the question arises as to whether awarding 
windfall profits to the creditor is the most appropriate response to the 
problem. 
One way of equitably and practically resolving the problem is to apply 
the de facto and estoppel concepts and thus eliminate windfall profits, but 
condition their application on an ex post imposition of the filing fee and 
applicable state taxes with interest.  That way, creditors do not get 
undeserved profits, business owners receive protection for their personal 
assets and at the same time are deterred by a real prospect of a financial 
penalty, the government is made more than financially whole, and the 
society is assured that its interest in ensuring obedience to the law remains 
intact. 
7. Prudential Policy-Making 
The experience with corporations counsels a prudent approach that 
does not hastily abolish the defective registration concepts of de facto LLC 
and LLC by estoppel.  Put succinctly, we need not repeat the mistake we 
saw with corporations in the case of LLCs.  In light of that, one 
commentator made the following apt observation in discussing the 
pertinent portion of an LLC statute300 passed by Kansas in 1993 that 
provided for joint and several individual liability for those acting as an 
LLC prior to proper formation301: 
This ill-considered provision is a near-verbatim replica of section 
146 of the original Model Business Corporation Act. It was 
intended to eliminate the case law doctrine of de facto 
corporations, at least when used by the stockholders of a 
defectively organized corporation as a defense to individual 
liability. This same section has also been held to repeal the 
related defense known as “corporation by estoppel.” Although 
the intent of section 146 may have been laudable, the lack of any 
explicit culpability requirement created the possibility that 
ruinous individual damages might be imposed on innocent, good 
faith investors in favor of third parties who in no way relied on 
such liability when dealing with the defective corporation and 
who were in no way caused harm by the defect in the 
corporation’s status. For this reason, the drafters of the Revised 
 
 299. Lake State Fed. Credit Union v. Tretsven, No. A07-1542, 2008 WL 2732111, at *3 
(Minn. Ct. App. July 15, 2008).  See also Stone v. Jetmar, 733 N.W.2d 480, 487 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2007) (“Allowing a form of future interest to vest in unorganized entities would be 
inconsistent with our public policy of encouraging legal organization.”). 
 300. Kansas Limited Liability Company Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7601-7652 (1993 
Supp.) (repealed 2000). 
 301. Id. § 17-7621 (repealed 2000). 
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Model Business Corporation Act added the requirement that the 
defendants must know of the lack of incorporation before liability 
will be imposed. . . . [T]here seems little to recommend a rule 
that can impose individual liability on good faith, innocent 
investors who never agreed to such liability, and that can 
correspondingly grant windfall recoveries to third parties who 
never bargained for or expected such individual liability. . . .302 
 Based on the foregoing, the author therefore called for an 
amendment of the provision “to make it clear that the defendants must 
know they lack authority to act as an LLC before they can be held jointly 
and severally liable.”303  The Kansas statute was eventually amended to 
eliminate that irksome provision.304  It is along the same lines that this work 
calls for the amendment of every relevant statute in the country to reflect 
this sentiment. 
B. Application of the Rule: A Taxonomy 
The rule proposed here will apply in the following manner to the 
scenarios laid out below. 
1. The lawyer’s oversight and purchase of land 
A and B agreed on a joint enterprise for the production and marketing 
of children’s television programs.  Upon their lawyer’s advice, they opt for 
an LLC as the most appropriate vehicle for accomplishing their 
professional and commercial objectives.  They signed organization 
documents prepared by their lawyer, who mailed them to the relevant State 
agency.  The lawyer mistakenly believed that one of the envelopes he 
recently received from the agency included a filed certificate of formation 
for this particular LLC and proceeded to inform the associates that their 
business has been registered.  In reality, for some inexplicable reasons, the 
documents were not filed by the agency until one week later.  Meanwhile 
two days after hearing from the lawyer, B signed an agreement to purchase 
a piece of land from C who, learning four months subsequently that the 
LLC was not formally organized at time of purchase and knowing that the 
value of the land has since appreciated considerably, wants to invalidate the 
transaction. 
A de facto LLC came into existence.  The associates made a colorable 
attempt to comply with the LLC statute and did not know of the lack of 
 
 302. Edwin W. Hecker Jr., Limited Liability Companies in Kansas, 63 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 
40, 46 (1994) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Revised Limited Liability Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7662 (2000). 
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formal organization.  Thus, the de facto LLC can take and convey title to 
real estate.  The vendor’s claim will fail. 
2. Supply of goods to the firm 
Assuming that from the example in (1) above, B on behalf of the firm 
entered into a contract with K for the supply of goods to the firm for its 
operations during the period the associates thought the firm was formally 
organized.  The goods were not fully paid for and Y seeks to hold the 
business owners personally liable. 
K will not succeed.  The firm is a de facto LLC that shields its 
members from personal liability. 
3. Benefits from contract 
X and Y signed a letter of intent to create an LLC.  Each of them took 
certain steps toward operating the business, such as applying for a credit 
card, requesting an employer identification number and opening a bank 
account, but the LLC was never formed.  Nevertheless, they operated the 
business as an LLC.  The “LLC” opened a discretionary advisory account 
with Geniuses, Inc., an investment advisory firm.  The “LLC” executed a 
discretionary investment advisory agreement giving Geniuses full 
discretion and authority to manage the advisory account.  In exchange for 
managing the account, Geniuses received approximately $85,000 in 
advisory fees over the course of the five years that the account remained 
open.  Eventually, the “LLC” closed the account because it was not 
satisfied with the propriety of the investments made by Geniuses.   
Thereafter, the “LLC” brought a lawsuit against Geniuses seeking damages 
for breach of contract and negligence in managing the “LLC’s” funds.   
Geniuses moved to dismiss the complaint asserting, among other things, 
that plaintiff failed to file its articles of organization and therefore was not a 
properly formed LLC; thus, it lacked the capacity to enter into the 
agreement and bring suit. 
Although there is no de facto corporation, since the parties cannot 
show colorable compliance, the business is an LLC by estoppel.  Having 
contracted with the firm on the basis that it was an LLC, the investment 
advisor cannot validly repudiate the contract on the claim that there was no 
validly organized LLC in existence.  The fact that the advisor derived 
benefits under the contract further strengthens the case against it. 
4. Goods received by the firm 
If in the example (3) above, H supplied goods to the business, dealing 
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with the owners as an LLC.  Later on, she turns around and seeks to hold 
the owners personally liable, contrary to the implied term of their contract 
that only the business is liable for obligations under the contract.   
H will not succeed, based on LLC by estoppel. 
5. Seeking to avoid state law 
Assume also from example (3) above that there is a law in the state in 
which the “LLC” operates its business requiring all LLCs and some other 
business entities to comply with certain workplace safety standards.  Some 
workers who took employment with the “LLC” on the belief that it was an 
LLC and thus under an obligation to assure their safety under the law, were 
injured while at work at the company’s business premises.  The “LLC” has 
refused to pay the compensation mandated under the state’s safety law, 
arguing that since it has not filed articles of organization, it was not an LLC 
and therefore not covered by the statute. 
The owners of the business represented the business as an LLC, on the 
basis of which the employees took the job.  When a responsibility to pay 
compensation arose, the doctrine of LLC by estoppel will step in to stop the 
firm and its owners from simultaneously approbating and reprobating, 
taking advantage of the LLC form when it suits them and abandoning the 
designation when it proves inconvenient. 
6. Personally liable if specific regulatory standards forbid 
Statute provides that a particular type of business, such as banking, 
can only be conducted by LLCs.  G & J assume to act as an LLC without 
authority and thereafter seek to avoid personal liability. 
G & J are personally liable. 
7. Inactive investors 
The directors of a Connecticut manufacturing corporation decided to 
organize an LLC in Massachusetts, and transfer to it the assets of the 
Connecticut corporation.  They took steps to that end, but apparently they 
did not follow the Massachusetts statute.  They effected the transfer and 
carried on business under the name of TransMac, LLC.  The directors did 
this without the knowledge of Z, a stockholder who afterwards exchanged 
her shares in the corporation for membership units in the LLC, but never 
participated in the business.  The plaintiff, who had discounted the 
corporation’s draft and had recovered forty-six percent, sued Z as a partner 
for the residue. 
Since Z was a non-participating associate, it will be unfair to hold her 
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personally liable for the debts of the firm, when she had nothing to with its 
organization and ensuring that it properly followed requirements.305   
Similarly, there should be limited liability protection for investors that 
contribute capital to an existing business on the understanding, based on a 
representation, that it was properly organized or protection should also be 
available to those investors who make a capital contribution with the 
express stipulation that funds should not be utilized until formal 
organization of business.  Since the passive investors neither acted as an 
LLC nor knew it was not formally organized, they are shielded.  This result 
makes sense, as one would be hard-pressed to present a fair basis for 
holding passive investors liable when it is clear they did not act, authorize 
others beforehand to act on their behalf or ratify their acts afterwards.306 
With regard to obligations arising from tort, the de facto doctrine as 
presented in this work will avail defendants in tort suits.  In essence, only 
members of an LLC who can show colorable compliance and absence of 
knowledge of lack of formal organization will be protected.  Lack of 
colorable compliance, colorable compliance with knowledge, or LLC by 
estoppel shall not be acceptable defenses to claims brought by tort 
creditors. 
C. Critiquing Proposal 
It would be naïve to expect the present proposal to glide through 
without formidable challenge, especially considering the enormous change 
it advocates in the country’s legislative landscape.  Without doubt, there is 
a coterie of credible criticisms that deserve further scrutiny and 
impeachment, if the experience in the corporate context is any guide. 
One criticism of the proposal focuses on perceived superfluity.  It 
faces the crucial question of need for creating or resorting to new doctrines 
of de facto LLC and LLC by estoppel when existing theories will suffice to 
address the problems.  More specifically, a pertinent question borders on 
the utility of the LLC by estoppel doctrine when the outcome in many cases 
 
 305. See In re W. Bank Trust Co., 163 F. 713, 724 (N.D. Texas 1908) (“In my judgment, 
it would be harsh and unjust to declare stockholders who became such after the concern was 
organized, who had nothing whatever to do with the management of its affairs, who were 
absolutely innocent of any wrong doing in relation thereto, to be partners in the concern and 
to declare them personally liable in all its obligations, and this simply because they were 
stockholders and had accepted the dividends declared on their stock. The immediate and 
inevitable consequence of such a holding here would be to inflict ruin on those who have 
not deserved it.”). 
 306. Levinsohn, supra note 21, at 278 (“In order to make one man liable for the acts of 
others, he must either directly or indirectly participate in the acts while they are being done 
or must authorize or direct them to be done beforehand or ratify and approve them 
afterwards.”). 
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would be the same under principles of basic contract law, such as the 
principle of promissory estoppel under § 90 of the Restatement of the Law 
of Contracts.307  For instance, at least in the private party litigation 
involving only a party using the lack of formal formation of an LLC to 
“weasel out” of or excuse its contract performance, the current majority 
rule would seem settled with or without the specific LLC rescue 
doctrines.308 
A direct response is that the proposed rescue doctrines, just as their 
counterparts in other business forms, go beyond the remedy that 
promissory estoppel affords.309  In Cantor v. Sunshine Greenery,310 the 
plaintiff entered into a lease with a corporation that at the time of signing 
the lease had not come into existence.  When the corporation repudiated the 
lease, the landlord sought to hold the president of the corporation 
personally liable, using the nonfiling of the incorporation documents at 
time of lease as basis.  The court held that the plaintiff was estopped to 
make that assertion because it dealt with Sunshine Greenery as a 
corporation.311  Thus, although the plaintiff did not make any 
representations as to the corporate existence of Sunshine Greenery, the 
corporation by estoppel prevented the plaintiff from succeeding in the quest 
for personal liability of the defendant.312 
Moreover, where an unformed LLC seeks to enforce a contract to 
which it is a party, the lack of formal organization may be a ground for 
dismissal of the suit.  In Boslow Family Limited Partnership v. Glickenhaus 
& Co.,313 where a limited partnership sued under a contract that was entered 
into before its formal formation, the defendant successfully moved the 
Supreme Court of New York to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the 
limited partnership had failed to file its certificate of limited partnership at 
the time of contract and prior to the commencement of the lawsuit.314  The 
appellate division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the decision.315   
It took the New York Court of Appeals, applying the LP by estoppel 
concept to reverse the decisions.316 
The proposal also faces criticism on the point that since the legislature 
 
 307. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §90 (1981). 
 308. I acknowledge the insight of Professor Holley on this point, for which I am grateful. 
 309. See 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 8:5 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2009) 
(discussing promissory estoppel, its requirements and limitations). 
 310. Cantor v. Sunshine Greenery, Inc., 398 A.2d 571 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979). 
 311. Id. 
 312. RAGAZZO & MOLL, supra note 42, at 292. 
 313. Boslow Family Ltd. P’ship v. Glickenhaus & Co., 860 N.E.2d 711 (N.Y. Dec. 14, 
2006). 
 314. Id. at 712. 
 315. Id. at 712. 
 316. Id. at 712-13. 
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has specified conditions for recognizing a business as an LLC, consequent 
upon which its owners enjoy a limited liability and its transactions are 
given validity, it is of questionable constitutional propriety – an intrusion 
on separation of powers – for the courts to disregard the requisite 
conditions and grant the same treatment and benefits of formal organization 
to businesses that have not met the conditions.317  This criticism, however, 
seems to overlook the fact that the courts have long exercised such powers 
outside the business law arena.  “It may well be answered that it is not for 
the courts to create public officers any more than to create corporations [or 
LLCs]; and yet the doctrine of de facto public officers is well 
established.”318  It would be a more profitable endeavor, it is submitted, to 
exert our efforts to deciphering and delineating where such judicial 
encroachments are justifiable on considerations of public policy.319   
Moreover, the legislature can give its blessing to the judicial approach a 
priori through the adoption of the kind of proposal presented here. 
Another criticism is one that has been leveled at assume-to-act 
provisions, including those with a knowledge component.  Writing in the 
corporate context, Professor Larry Ribstein laments that “the rule persists 
today by statute in many jurisdictions that those ‘assuming’ or ‘purporting’ 
to act in the name of a corporation that they know has not been formally 
incorporated are personally liable to creditors with whom they contract.”320   
The scholar notes that the consequence of the rule has been “results that 
were surprising and clearly contrary to the expectations of both parties.”321 
A key weakness of Professor Ribstein’s criticism is that while he 
assails assume-to-act provisions that contain a “knowledge” component, he 
cites cases that were decided under a different legal regime (i.e. statutes 
without a scienter requirement) or that would have been decided differently 
by any court faithfully interpreting the provision proposed herein.322  In a 
nutshell, the cases involve situations in which the defendants were not 
acting with knowledge of the lack of incorporation, which under the 
present proposal would have entitled them to exoneration.  In one of the 
cases he cites,323 the court held defendants personally liable for a debt 
 
 317. See Warren I, supra note 87, at 468–69 (raising a similar point in the corporate 
context). 
 318. Id. at 469. 
 319. See id. (“The question therefore reduces itself at last to a question of judgment. Are 
there considerations of public policy so urgent as to make it proper for the courts to allow 
persons to assert the right to be a corporation even when, on a sound construction of the 
legislative enactments, they have no such right?”). 
 320. Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. 
REV. 80, 121 (1991) [hereinafter Ribstein, Limited Liability] (citation omitted). 
 321. Id. at 121-22. 
 322. Id. at 122 n.184. 
 323. T.K. Distrib., Inc. v. Soldevere, 704 P.2d 280 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). 
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incurred during a short interval when the corporation’s charter was revoked 
for failure to file an annual report and pay an applicable fee, even though 
neither party was aware of the revocation.324  In the second case cited,325 the 
court imposed personal liability notwithstanding the fact that both parties 
were under the belief that there was incorporation.326  Under the 
formulation in this article, absent other factors unconnected with 
“knowledge,” defendants in both cases would not be held personally 
liable.327  Thus, courts are expected to adopt the same line of reasoning 
deployed by a Connecticut superior court when dealing with a case 
involving the State’s version of the provision in a recent case.328  In that 
case, the defendant averred that he was unaware that there was no 
incorporation and the court held that since the plaintiff had “failed to prove 
the knowing aspect of the statute . . . , the defendant operated as an officer 
of a de facto corporation and is entitled to corporate protection.”329 
In fairness to Professor Ribstein, one cannot ignore the fact there 
could be isolated instances where the court misconstrues a purporting-to-
act provision with a knowledge component to impose personal liability 
even in the absence of knowledge on the part of the defendant.  For 
instance, the Supreme Court of Iowa recently construed,330 as imposing 
personal liability for transactions that occur in the absence of de jure 
incorporation, the Iowa Business Corporations Act’s provision that “[a]ll 
persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing there 
was no incorporation under this Act, are jointly and severally liable for all 
liabilities created while so acting.”331  This construction was clearly 
mistaken as the court appears to be confusing the law before and after the 
1984 revision of the MBCA.332  The court quoted the comment to section 
2.04 of MBCA 1984 out of context and cited pre-1984 judicial authority to 
support its interpretation of a provision that came into place in 1984 as a 
change of the prior situation it was referencing.333 
On the other side of the spectrum, the proposal may be criticized for 
watering down the accepted stipulation in many quarters that those who 
 
 324. Id. 
 325. Thompson & Green Machinery Co., Inc. v. Music City Lumber Co., 683 S.W.2d 
340 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 326. Id. 
 327. See also Bradley, supra note 8, at 544 n.129 (opining that under the knowledge 
provision, “the result [in Soldevere] would presumably have been different”). 
 328. Gallagher v. Whitteaker, No. PJRFSTCV075004857S, 2008 WL 344574, at *1 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2008). 
 329. Id. at *1 (emphasis in original). 
 330. Estate of Woodroffe, 742 N.W.2d 94, 102 (Iowa 2007). 
 331. Id. at 103 (emphasis in original). 
 332. Id. at 103–04. 
 333. Id. 
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assume to act as a corporation or LLC without authority to do so are 
personally liable for any resulting obligations.  By shielding not only those 
who so acted, but lacked knowledge of their lack of authority, but also 
those who knew of the lack of authority even where the third party did not 
possess such knowledge, the proposal’s formulation of LLC by estoppel 
may be protecting equity investors at the expense of creditors.  This is 
problematic in the case of innocent creditors, i.e., those who did not know 
of the lack of formal organization as opposed to those who knew but 
proceeded to deal with the entity as though it were validly organized. 
While stating that it may be understandable and acceptable to accord 
limited liability status to business associates who enter into a contract with 
a third party, where neither party knows the business does not enjoy de jure 
or de facto status, Professor Merrick Dodd has argued forcefully that a 
different result should obtain where only the associates possessed such 
knowledge.334  In such situations, the associates knew of the lack of formal 
organization and chose deliberately to mislead the third party as to their 
true status.  Professor Dodd acknowledges that limited liability may be an 
implied term of the contract and that it would be an uphill, if not an 
impossible, task for the third party to prove he has been injured by the 
misrepresentation.  However, Dodd insists that such a contract should not 
be enforced.335  Noting that since the associates’ claim to limited liability 
protection is not statutory but founded on an implied contract that is “based 
on the theory that the outsider who has accepted their fraudulent statement 
as the truth should be deemed bound by his ignorance,” Professor Dodd 
“submitted that no such claim should be tolerated.”336  One may concede 
that where associates misrepresent their business as an LLC, giving them 
immunity simply because a third party dealt with them as an LLC may 
sometimes provide them with an unjustified cover.  Therefore, third party 
creditors should be able to hold them personally liable.  However, it is 
submitted that the protection should not be denied unless the 
misrepresentation was material and the creditor was injured by it.337 
However, there is no reason to assume that this is the case at all times 
or that, as some scholars claim, the entrepreneur “committed a fraud on the 
 
 334. Dodd, supra note 73, at 557. 
 335. Id. at 554, 557. 
 336. Id. at 557 (citation omitted). 
 337. See also Ribstein, Limited Liability, supra note 320, at 111 (citation omitted): 
If a firm calls itself a “corporation” or a “limited partnership” creditors 
justifiably expect that the firm is subject to the provisions of a corporation 
statute, and that the firm has made a public filing containing certain basic 
information. Thus, it might be appropriate in this situation to refuse to enforce 
the limited liability contract on the grounds of material misrepresentation or 
nondisclosure. However, this result should obtain only if the misrepresentation 
was material and if the creditor was injured by it. 
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plaintiff” that warrants the full wrath of unlimited liability.338  One example 
may help to illustrate the point.  A government agency that wants to 
support the state’s goal of raising revenue through formal registration of 
businesses restricts bidding for its contracts to such businesses.  An 
entrepreneur, X, has extensive experience in the area of the particular 
project.  X lost his job a month ago and decided to go into business on his 
own.  He bids for the contract on behalf of his business, which at the 
moment was an unformed LLC, but never discloses the fact of a lack of 
formal registration.  X could not register the LLC because of time 
constraints relating to the deadline for acceptance of bids.  The bid is 
successful.  X can execute the contract effectively without any harm to the 
agency.  In fact, it may benefit the agency more than if the contract had 
gone to less experienced and effective hands whose only advantage is that 
they won the time race in completing registration of their business before 
the end of the bid process.   A fortiori, in similar transactions involving 
only private parties, immunity from personal liability should prevail. 
Creditor protection also forms the basis of another criticism.  While 
registration confers the benefit of limited liability, it also carries with it the 
burden of disclosure.  Some states require LLC organizers to disclose 
certain information in the articles of organization, including the number of 
membership units, the company’s registered address and state of 
organization.339  Disclosure serves a creditor-protection function, as a 
potential creditor is entitled to rely on the disclosed information in making 
a decision on whether or not to deal with a particular business outfit.  Since 
this information disclosure may be pertinent to a prospective creditor’s 
decision-making and protection, extending limited liability only to those 
who have complied serves as a default mechanism for penalizing those who 
have not provided such information and the concomitant creditor 
protection, thus compelling them to provide it or risk personal liability.340   
By affording limited liability protection to those operating without 
registration as an LLC, the proposal here could defeat the operation of this 
default mechanism and deprive creditors of a valuable protective tool. 
One must admit that the criticism has some merit.  LLC statutes may 
require articles of organization to disclose owner contributions to the 
company, which undoubtedly “have some bearing on creditor interests,”341 
thus providing fodder for the argument against extending limited liability 
 
 338. Timothy R. Wyatt, The Doctrine of Defective Incorporation and its Tenuous 
Coexistence with the Model Business Corporation Act, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 833, 873-
74 (2009). 
 339. CALLISON & SULLIVAN, LLCS, supra note 140. 
 340. For a presentation and discussion of this criticism in the corporate context, and 
counter-arguments thereto, see Ribstein, Limited Liability, supra note 320, at 110. 
 341. Id. (citation omitted). 
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protection to those who have not made such disclosure in a filed public 
document.342  On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that creditor-
protection provisions based on “legal capital” are not as effective as they 
appear in accomplishing their objective of limiting distribution of assets to 
owners, as they have fallen prey to extensive manipulation.343  Creditors 
have also devised alternative, more effective means of protecting 
themselves in dealing with limited liability entities.344  In addition, the 
criticism would have been more forceful if all or most of the required 
disclosures pertained to creditor protection, but that is obviously not the 
case.345  For instance, the disclosure of total membership interests – 
analogous to disclosure of authorized shares – is not meant for protection 
of creditors, but instead aims at protecting LLC members from future 
dilution of their ownership interests.346 
Also, the disclosures are of no import to tort victims of registered 
companies, thus placing tort victims of registered LLCs and de facto LLCs 
on the same footing if personal investor liability is also denied in the latter 
case.347  Further, creditors can demand the relevant information from 
investors and if it is not provided, adjust their cost of credit accordingly.348   
In any case, as important as this criticism is, it does not provide sufficient 
justification for punishing a good number of innocent investors who had no 
knowledge that their business has not been properly organized under the 
relevant LLC statute.  A question posed almost a century ago, based on a 
valid observation that mirrors current experience, still resonates and has 
relevance today: 
The courts have been exceedingly solicitous to protect creditors 
who, as experience has shown, are usually alert to guard 
themselves from imposition. Should there not be a disposition to 
give more adequate protection to the unwary investor in stocks 
who, more frequently than the creditor, is the victim of 
imposition and fraud, and who stands in need of greater 
protection?349 
The proposal may also be assailed for fostering an anti-competitive 
environment.  Levying the charge in the corporate context, Professor 
 
 342. For a contrary position, see BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS JR., LEGAL 
CAPITAL 50-57 (3d ed. 1990). 
 343. Id.; Ribstein, Limited Liability, supra note 320, at 109. 
 344. MANNING & HANKS, supra note 342.  See also Carpenter, supra note 86, at 425 
(stating that experience has shown that creditors “are usually alert to guard themselves from 
imposition”). 
 345. See Ribstein, Limited Liability, supra note 320, at 110. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. at 127. 
 348. Id. at 110. 
 349. Carpenter, supra note 86, at 425 (citation omitted). 
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Ribstein notes that purporting-to-act “provisions have an anti-competitive 
effect in that they help preserve the states’ monopoly over corporate terms 
by preventing competition by private ordering alternatives.  Those who 
seek corporate features, particularly including limited liability, must pay 
franchise taxes and deal with state legislators for changes in the statutes.”350   
A similar point has been raised by Professor William Carney who notes 
that “[c]orporate laws also contain provisions that can be read broadly to 
preclude the use of other means to limit liability, by providing that persons 
who purport to act as a corporation, where none has been created, are 
jointly and severally liable for the enterprise’s obligations.”351 
My first response is that the proposal does not create a bar to contracts 
by creditors and equity investors to clothe the latter with limited liability.   
It is perfectly within the province and power of a party to many kinds of 
business transactions to agree beforehand not to hold the other party 
personally liable for obligations under the contract.352  Prime examples are 
nonrecourse contracts353 that have been widely utilized in recent times by 
litigation finance companies.354  While in the past, there might have been 
difficulties in enforcing such or similar contracts, today’s courts are 
amenable to enforcing them.355  Professor Ribstein’s concerns presumably 
 
 350. Ribstein, Limited Liability, supra note 320, at 123-124. 
 351. William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 855, 876 (1995). 
 352. See Levinsohn, supra note 21, at 287 (stating that “the courts from early times have 
upheld contracts limiting liability by appropriate stipulation, even in the case of common 
carriers”). 
 353. See Mitchell F. Crusto, Extending the Veil to Solo Entrepreneurs: A Limited 
Liability Sole Proprietorship Act (LLSP), 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 381, 427 (2001) 
(stating that “in a nonrecourse contract, a creditor voluntarily contracts to look to the 
business assets and not the personal assets of the business owner for recourse should the 
loan default”) (citation omitted).  A limitation of nonrecourse contracts as a liability limiting 
device, however, is that its availability is limited to voluntary, and not involuntary, creditors.  
See id. at 428. 
 354. See Myron C. Grauer, Justice O’Connor’s Approach to Tax Cases: Could She Have 
Led the Court Toward A More Collaborative Role For the Judiciary in the Development of 
Tax Law?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 69, 78 (2007) (describing a non-recourse loan as a loan for 
which the borrower bears no responsibility for its repayment beyond the borrower’s interest 
in the property used in securing the loan).  For a discussion of non-recourse finance in the 
litigation funding area, see Eileen Libby, Whose Lawsuit Is It?: Ethics Opinions Express 
Mixed Attitudes About Litigation Funding Arrangements, 89 A.B.A. J. 36 (2003) (stating 
that litigation funding companies offer non-recourse finance, “meaning that if the case loses 
at trial or is overturned on appeal, the client is not obligated to reimburse the funder”); Julia 
H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 
615 (2007); Mariel Rodak, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the Litigation 
Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 506-07 (2006) 
(stating that with non-recourse financing, “if the plaintiff ultimately loses her case at trial 
she has no obligation to repay the amount advanced, and the [finance] company thus forfeits 
its entire investment”) (citation omitted). 
 355. Ribstein, Limited Liability, supra note 320, at 112-13 nn.139-142 and 
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stem from the fact that individuals could not contract within themselves to 
confer limited liability upon themselves and make the contract binding on 
non-parties when they do not have a privilege from the state to do so.356   
While a reasoned argument can be made that third parties contracting with 
the enterprise can decide for themselves if they want to be bound by the 
limited liability agreement entered into by the entrepreneurs, it does not 
seem that allowing the state to exercise a monopoly in this fashion is 
necessarily an egregious delegation of power.357 
Finally, the proposal may also be disfavored by those who would view 
it as encouraging indolence and rewarding irresponsibility.  Writing about 
the Utah Business Corporation Act and the elimination of de facto 
corporations in that state, one commentator restated that “the requirements 
are straightforward and easy to satisfy.  Negligent or ignorant individuals 
should not be shielded from the effects of their actions or bargains if they 
have not acted with sufficient care to meet with the requirements of the 
statute.”358  Nevertheless, I maintain that even the less diligent, who made 
effort but somehow failed in their bid to attend to every detail in the 
 
accompanying text. 
 356. See e.g., Wells v. Mackay Telegraph-Cable Co., 239 S.W. 1001, 1007 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1921) where the court stated: 
The public in its dealings with such business organizations has a right to the 
protection afforded them by our statutes regulating the formation of 
corporations. This protection would be greatly lessened if it should be held that 
by declaring and recording a declaration of trust persons can associate 
themselves together for business purposes, giving their organization all the 
powers of a corporation and limiting their individual liability, without 
complying with statutes which require proof of funds or assets of such an 
association before a charter will be granted it to conduct its business. 
Id.  See also Thompson v. Schmitt, 274 S.W. 554, 559-60 (Tex. 1925) (holding that only the 
limited partnership acts provide the means of obtaining limited liability outside the 
corporate form).  This “judicial and legislative hostility” to attempts to enjoy corporate 
attributes, including limited liability by non-corporate groups is believed, among other 
reasons, to have precipitated the demise of the joint stock company.  Carney, supra note 
351, at 876. 
 357. For the argument that the contrary position, i.e., assumption of corporate privileges 
by non-corporate forms was against public policy, see EDWARD H. WARREN, CORPORATE 
ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION 398-404 (1929).  See also Breeze, supra note 56, at 
3 (“It follows that no association of individuals organized to engage in a business enterprise 
by any act or declaration not in pursuance of the enabling statute can divest itself of the 
character of a partnership and clothe itself with that of a corporation.”) (citation omitted).  
See also Carney, supra note 351, at 876 (highlighting the claim by another scholar that “the 
essence of corporate status – limited liability for investors – should only be obtainable upon 
terms prescribed by the legislature for protection of creditors, and upon payment of 
whatever revenues the state demands, thus revealing the statist basis for arguments against 
private limitations of liability”) (citation omitted). 
 358. Waddoups, supra note 8, at 312 (citation omitted). 
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formation process, deserve a second chance in the halls of equity.359 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Some scholars have raised, and impeached, some of the arguments for 
not recognizing de facto LLCs and LLCs by estoppel.  First, where there 
has been a misrepresentation of the existence of a limited liability 
company, a credible argument can be made for providing legal recourse to 
misled or injured creditors against the investors personally.360  On the other 
hand, those creditors whose expectations were not extinguished or altered 
have suffered no injury and should not be provided rights or remedies 
beyond their bargain.361  Further, the major goal of imposing personal 
liability for preformation contracts is to ensure compliance with statutory 
provisions and thereby obviate a situation where injured creditors are left 
without effective recourse because no firm assets are available and the 
whereabouts of the organizers may not be known.362  In addition, not 
clothing investors with limited liability in all cases where they enter into 
transactions prior to compliance with statutory formation assures that states 
do not lose registration fees and franchise tax revenues, which otherwise 
would have been the case.363 
The central argument of this work, based on a close examination of 
the arguments in favor and against, is that the de facto and estoppel 
concepts should be recognized in the LLC context.  However, the 
protection should be limited only to cases when investors, in good faith, 
believe that a limited liability company had been formed or where the 
parties’ transaction was conducted on the basis that an LLC is a party.  This 
approach will simplify the application of the concepts while ensuring 
justice and fairness.  The principal objective of this article, therefore, is the 
articulation of a case for states with a different approach or no clear 
approach to amend their LLC statutes accordingly. 
 
 359. See also BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 16, at ¶ 6.02[2][d][iii] (referencing the 
views of some authorities that “ease of organization is no reason to penalize entrepreneurs 
over technicalities”). 
 360. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 17, § 4:15. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. 
